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INTRODUCTION

In the early 1970s, the United States saw its cheap energy
costs disappearing and its strength and security imperiled by a
growing dependence on foreign oil.' Both the public and private
sectors groped for energy saving solutions to check rising costs

and reduce oil importation. 2 Cogeneration emerged as an attrac-

1. During the 20 years preceding the 1973 oil embargo, total energy
consumption rose at an annual rate of 3.5%. Petroleum consumption rose 4.0%,
more than doubling previous rates. However, domestic petroleum production
increased by just 2.1% annually, leading to a growing dependence on imported
oil. McCarley & Fichman, Trends in U.S. Energy Since 1973, MONTHLY ENERGY
Rnv., May 1983, at i.
In 1973, energy imports supplied 17% of domestic consumption; by 1977,
the rate had risen to 23.6%. Id. at iii. Petroleum imports reached a peak of 8.6
million barrels in 1977. Id. at iv. By 1982, imports dropped to 10.4% of domestic
consumption and oil imports fell to 4.2 million barrels per day. Id. at iii-iv.
As a result of the oil embargo and the Iranian revolution later in the decade,
the cost of a single barrel of petroleum rose from $4.08 in 1973 to a peak of
$37.05 in 1981. Id. at i-ii. Consequently, total energy expenditures continued to
rise, even though consumption slowed throughout the 1970s and actually declined
beginning in 1978. Energy Info. Admin., Highlights: Energy Price and Expenditure Data Report, 1970-1980, MONTHLY ENERGY REv., July 1983, at i. In 1982,
total energy expenditures fell for the first time following the energy crisis. Energy
Info. Admin., Highlights: State Energy Price and ExpenditureReport, 1970-1982,
MONTHLY ENERGY REv., Mar. 1985, at i.
2. Commentators noted that "[tihe oil embargo, coupled with the explosion of international crude oil prices, revealed U.S. vulnerability to foreign supply
disruptions and set in motion profound changes in the pattern of domestic energy
consumption and supply." McCarley & Fichman, supra note 1, at i. See generally
Pratt, Cogeneration:A Successful Response to the Energy Crisis?, 9 Fo.DHAM
URn. L.J. 483 (1981); Note, Public Utility Participationin Decentralized Power
Production, 5 H~Av. ENvmL. L. REv. 297 (1981).
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tive 3 old technology, but with formidable obstacles to expanded
use.

Conventional powerplants use steam produced from fossil,
waste, or nuclear fuel to drive electric generators. Any surplus

3. Cogeneration is the simultaneous production of electricity and heat,
usually in the form of steam, from a single fuel source. Both the electricity and
heat are used productively to increase the efficiency of fuel use. See FEDERAL
ENERGY REGULATION COMMISSION (FERC) STATUTES AND REGULATIONS, REGULATIONS PREAMBLES 1977-1981, at (P) 30,134.
Cogeneration is not a new technology in the United States. In the early part
of this century, approximately 50% of the country's electricity was cogenerated.
Electricity was produced by reciprocating engines that released steam as a byproduct. This exhaust steam provided district heating. The infant electricity
industry, as a means of increasing its sales and competing with industrial
cogenerators, began to provide both electricity and steam heat to its customers.
By 1902, approximately 3600 private and public electric generating systems existed
in the United States. Wooster, Cogeneration: Revival Through Legislation?, 87
DICK.

L. REv. 705, 706-07 (1983).

However, technological changes soon pushed cogeneration into a period of
decline that lasted almost 60 years. In 1903, the turbogenerator was developed.
Although this unit produced electricity more efficiently, it reduced the quality of
waste steam. Additionally, the newly developed alternating current enabled utilities
to economically distribute electricity over longer distances, allowing generating
facilities to be located further from urban areas. Id. at 707.
Through the next several decades, technological advances in producing and
distributing steam heat did not parallel the advances made in producing and
transmitting electricity. Furthermore, in order to better compete with industrial
cogenerators, electric utilities began offering preferential rates to industrial customers. Id. at 708.
The environment for cogeneration deteriorated further in the 1940s as the
country discovered and used its seemingly inexhaustible supply of natural gas
and oil for space heating. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, DISTRICT HEATING
AND COMBINED HEAT AND POWER

SYSTEMS: A

TECHNOLOGY

REmrIw 249 (1983)

[hereinafter IEA REvIEw]. Urban renewal programs begun in the 1950s also
contributed to the demise of cogeneration, as older buildings and the district

heating systems attached to them were destroyed.

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COMMITTEE ON DISTRICT HEATING AND COOLING, DISTRICT HEATING AND COOLING
IN THE UNITED STATES: PROSPECTS AND ISSUES 26 (1985).

During the 1970s, rising fuel costs and restrictive pollution control regulations
increased the attractiveness of individual heating systems over the district heating
systems used by cogenerators. Id. In 1973, it was estimated that industrial

cogeneration accounted for only 4.2% of the total United States electric supply.
Munson, The Growing Role of Independent Energy Producers, 115 PUB. UTIL.
FORT., May 30, 1985, at 13. By the end of the decade, industrial generation of
electricity and steam declined to less than 4% of the country's energy production.
Pratt, supra note 2, at 485 n.4 (citing FERC, COGENERATION FACT SHEET 1 (Nov.
1, 1979)).
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heat energy is released into the environment. 4 Cogeneration facilities, on the other hand, use this excess heat productively, substantially increasing the energy system's efficiency. Theoretically,

fuel consumption can be halved and production doubled. 5

Market dynamics and the perishable nature of cogeneration's
products, i.e., heat and power, have impeded the growth of this
energy system. Developing efficient and economical storage systems

for heat and power presents a challenge even more difficult than
marketing ice before the advent of refrigeration. 6 Additionally,
although electrical system performance is optimized by a constant
rate of operation, the use patterns of heat and power vary by

hour, day, and season, inevitably resulting in surplus energy.
Since excess heat can be transported only over relatively short
distances, and frequently with considerable capital investment costs,
cogeneration systems are most efficient when designed and operated7
to match the operator's heat needs, with surplus power being sold.
Fortunately for the cogenerator, electricity can be absorbed and
managed within an existing utility market-a proposition that the
electricity industry has had difficulty accepting. 8

4. Mogk, Anglo-American Energy Policy: Combined Heat and Power in
the United Kingdom and the United States, 8 URB. L. & PoL'Y l31 (1986).
5. Cogeneration can increase the efficiency of fuel use from 33% to 80%.
Casten & Ross, Cogeneration and Its Regulation, 107 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar.
26, 1981, at 18; Pratt, supra note 2, at 486; Note, Problems with PURPA: The
Need for State Legislation to Encourage Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 11 B.C. ENvTL. As. L. Rav. 149, 149-50 (1983).
6. One commentator has noted: "Batteries now available cannot economically be constructed to store large amounts of electric energy. Moreover, most
batteries have a relatively short life in terms of charge-discharge cycles." Pratt,
supra note 2, at 498 n.37 (citing Putting Baseload to Work on the Night Shift,
ELECTRIC POWER REs. INST., Apr. 1980, at 6-9.)

7. A study by the International Energy Agency states:
Many large power stations are located remote from the centres of
population for reasons of economy, environmental protection, fuel..-.
accessibility and storage, etc. Thus, while the heat available at .large
power stations may technically be recovered for district heating and may
match the demand of a large city, the cost of the transmission line can
be prohibitive. At present the maximum economically viable transmission
distance is up to ... 3-5km for steam, depending on the heat load anq(..
fuel prices.

IEA REviaw, supra note 3, at 47.
8. The utility industry has been accused of erecting several barriers to the
increased use of cogeneration, including: (1) using stonewall negotiating tactics
to unnecessarily delay contractual commitments; (2) offering cogenerators discriminatorily high rates for standby, maintenance, and supplemental power; (3)
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Although the electricity industry is largely investor-owned, it
is highly regulated due to its monopolistic nature and its critical
importance to the American public's health, safety, and general
welfare. 9 Administrative controls at federal, state, and local levels
affect the planning, construction, operation, and marketing activities of electric utilities. The cogenerator must function within this
regulatory framework and attempt to minimize its burdens and
maximize its benefits. Any attempts to function outside the regulations would leave the operator without a ready market for surplus
power and with little capability of storing it.I °
Commerce is governed by both state and federal regulations,
and states frequently implement and enforce federal laws. This is
the case with the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA),"
which governs transactions between the electric industry and cogenerators. PURPA 2 significantly advanced cogeneration development in the United States, spawning a multi-billion dollar industry
that greatly exceeded the drafters' expectations.' 3 PURPA, the

applying uneven policies in determining avoided cost; (4) imposing unnecessary
and costly interconnection requirements; and (5) denying cogenerators access to
transmission facilities. See The Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
and its Effect on Competition in the Electric Power Industry: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Energy Conservation and Power of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-12 (1986) [hereinafter House
PURPA Report] (statement of Phillip Van Huffel, President, Industrial CoEnergy
Systems and Executive Vice President, Enegrid Investment, Ltd.).
In response, it has been argued that the question of barriers to competition
to cogenerators is moot, as there is "no compelling reason to support the
contention that competition can now or in the near future guarantee cheaper,
more reliable and-or more efficient energy service." Id. at 389 (statement of the
Illinois Dep't of Energy and Natural Resources).
9. See infra notes 16-36 and accompanying text.
10. See Mogk, supra note 4, at 135: "The electricity industry in the ...
U.S. is as a practical matter the only supplier to and purchaser of power from
the CHP [combined heat and power] operator .... ." See also Lock & Van
Kuiken, Cogeneration and Small Power Production: State Implementation of
Section 210 of PURPA, 3 SOLAR L. REP. 659, 661 (1981).
11. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92
Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 15, 16, 30, 42 and
43 U.S.C.).
12. PURPA was promulgated in 1978 as part of the National Energy Act
(NEA). For a summary of the legislative history of the NEA, see H.R. REP. No.
543, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN.
NEws 7673.
13. Cogeneration projects initiated under PURPA now constitute a majority
of the new generating capacity in several parts of the country. See infra note
205 and accompanying text.
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Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA), 14 and the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977 (CAA)15 represent the principal
legislation affecting the use and expansion of cogeneration in the
United States today.
This Article begins with a short history of the development of
the electric utility industry. The discussion then focuses on the
three main pieces of legislation a cogenerator will face when
entering the electric supply industry: PURPA, the FUA, and the
CAA. Although concentrating on PURPA, the Article discusses
the benefits and requirements created by all three Acts. Finally, a
review of the Detroit, Michigan cogeneration project and the
regulatory scheme surrounding its use provides a current example
of the impact of the present regulatory framework on cogeneration
projects in the United States.
II.

UTILITY REGULATORY FRAMEwoRK

Since cogenerators must work very closely with utilities, industries or businesses interested in entering the field of cogeneration
should be familiar with the present system of utility regulation.
This section provides a brief historical review of the development
of this regulation, and concludes with an explanation of the present
responsibilities of state and federal regulators.
Utilities were allowed to develop as natural monopolies because
of a perception that they could produce and distribute energy more
efficiently in a non-competitive setting.' 6 However, monopolies
have generally led to abuses of economic power when unchecked
by competition. Accordingly, where government has nurtured mo-

14. Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620,
92 Stat. 3289 (codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 15, 16, 42, and 49 U.S.C.).
See infra notes 245-63 and accompanying text.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-76 (1982). See infra notes 264-83 and accompanying

text.
16. C. PrmLns, THE REGULATION OF PUBLC UTILITIEs: THEORY AND PRAcT CE 5 (2d ed. 1985). See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATIONS: PRIUNCIPIES
AND INSTITUTIONS 117 (1971). Kahn notes that a natural monopoly exists when

an industry exhibits decreasing costs of production as the quantity of production
increases. Id. at 119. Natural monopolies usually involve firms with substantial
fixed and start-up costs. Consequently, the larger the firm, the lower its costs of

production and the greater its ability to survive in the marketplace. Id. at 11820. But see W. PRIMEAUX, DIRECT ELECTRIC UTIrrY COMPETITION: THE NATURAL
MONOPOLY MYTH 16-18 (1985) (natural monopoly concept not useful when

concluding that utilities should not face competition).
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regulated the industry.' 7 The utility
nopolization, it has eventually
8
exception.'
no
industry is
A.

Pre-Commission Regulation

When public utilities appeared in the late 1800s and early
1900s, states used selective approaches to protect the public interest.

These efforts fell into three categories: (1) judicial control; (2)
legislative regulation; and (3) franchising. Under the first approach,
the courts, adopting a rule of fairness, required businesses that
affected the public interest, including utilities, to serve all area

customers in an adequate and nondiscriminatory fashion at reasonable rates.' 9 In general, this method of regulation was expensive,

slow, and inefficient.20 The second method, legislative regulation,
used special corporate charters, general incorporation laws, and
specific statutes to define a utility's sphere of activity.21 However,
as the industry grew and the need for greater control increased,

the legislative process was unable to meet the challenge. 22 Under
the third approach, franchise agreements describing the parties'
benefits and burdens were negotiated between the utility and the
local government. 23 However, even more than legislative enactments, these agreements were no match for the changing times

and conditions.24
A need for greater enterprise, flexibility, and continuity in the
regulatory process became apparent.25 Independent regulatory com-

missions (administrative agencies) answered this need, first at the
state level, then at the federal level for regional or national matters.

17. Regulation is viewed as both necessary and desirable to insure protection
of the public interest. See C. PHILLIPS, supra note 16, at 3.
18. Electric utilities are allowed to monopolize particular service areas, but
in return the utilities must submit to regulation, which substitutes for ordinary
market forces. See 3 PUB. UTI. REP. GUIDE at 1 (1983); Note, supra note 5, at
153.
19. See M. FAMuS & R. SAMPSON, PuBLIc UTImLrms:

REGULATION,

MAN-

AGE1MENT, AND OWNERSHIP 60-61 (1973); C. PHILLIPs, supra note 16, at 110.

20. C. PiLirPs, supra note 16, at 111.

21. M. FAmus & R. SAMPSON, supra note 19, at 61-62; C. PHILis, supra
note 16, at 111-12.
22. M. FAius & R. SAMPSON, supra note 19, at 62.
23. Id. at 62-63; C. PHILLIPs, supra note 16, at 112-14.
24. C. PHILLIPS, supra note 16, at 113-14. Some of these regulatory methods
still exist in some form at state and local levels.
25. Id. at 115.
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State Commissions

At both the state and federal levels, independent 26 regulatory
commissions continuously supervise the electric utility industry,
attempting to protect the interests of the public and enforce the
utilities' obligations. 27 Commissions are empowered to affirmatively
review utility initiatives, but as a matter of practice, their role is
largely reactive to utility actions or requests. A commission can,
however, initiate corrective measures, such as finding a rate schedule unreasonable and ordering it adjusted. 28 Commission decisions
are subject to judicial review to determine whether the agency has
acted properly and within its prescribed powers. Usually, commissions are granted broad latitude in matters of discretion, and
29
decisions are only overturned if they are arbitrary or capricious.
States and municipalities have regulated the utility industry
from its inception 0 State commissions, called "public service
commissions" or "public utility commissions," vary in size from
three to ten members, with both appointed and elected members.
Commissions generally possess broad authority and have jurisdiction over the telephone, gas, and water industries, as well as the
electric power industry.3 1 They have the authority to set retail rates
and company performance standards, and to establish rate adjustment mechanisms and service areas.3 2 The benefits to utilities from
26. 3 PUB. UTnI. REP. GUIDE at 6 (1983). The commissions are independent,
in theory, from the other branches of government for four reasons. First,
appointments are for definite but staggered terms. Second, no more than a
majority of commissioners may come from the same political party. Third, the
power to remove commission members is limited. Finally, the procedural features
of the commission inhibit executive control. C. PHILU's, supra note 16, at 13233. This independent status was aimed at keeping political influence out of the
commissions' work and decisions. Id. at 133.
27. 4 PUB. UTIL. REP. GUIDE at 1 (1983). The duties of public utilities
include: (1) serving all who seek service within the area of operation; (2) rendering

service at fair and reasonable rates; (3) serving all qualified customers in a
nondiscriminatory manner; and (4) rendering safe, adequate, and satisfactory
service. 3 PUB. UTIL. REP. GUIDE at 2 (1983). In return, public utilities have
several rights. See infra text accompanying note 33.
28. See 3 PUn. UTIL. REP. GUIDE at 6-8 (1983).
29. See American Paper Inst., Inc. v. America Elec. Power Serv. Corp.,
461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983) (FERC "full-avoided-cost rule must be reviewed
solely under the more lenient arbitrary-and-capricious standard ....
).
30. S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY,
POWER COMMISSION 91 (1974).

ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL

31. 4 PuB. UT. REP. GUIDE at 7 (1983).
32. See S. FENN, AMERICA'S ELECTRIC UTILITrEs:
TRANSITION

(1984).

UNDER SIEGE AND IN
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state regulation, in turn, are several: (1) the right to a reasonable
price for service; (2) the right to reasonable operating conditions;
(3) protection from competition; and (4) the use of the state's
police power through eminent domain to construct the electricity
33
system.
C. Federal Regulation
Although Congress can control virtually every aspect of utility
operations, the federal role largely supplements the state commissions. 34 Federal regulations date from 1920, when the Federal
Power Commission (FPC) was created to administer the Federal
Water Power Act.3 5 The Federal Power Act of 1935 broadened
the FPC's power, giving it authority over the interstate transmission
and sale of wholesale electricity, but leaving the regulation of retail
electric power rates to state commissions. 6 The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) replaced the FPC in 1977, and
retained the FPC's powers over the electricity industry. As with
state commissions, the FERC can exercise only specific delegated
powers. However, Congress has granted the FERC a broad scope
of regulatory authority.
The National Energy Act (NEA) of 197837 added important
cogeneration regulation responsibilities to the FERC. PURPA, one
of the NEA's five acts, is most important to the cogenerator and
represents an unprecedented federal step into the retail electricity
domain of state commissions.
III.
A.

PURPA

In General

Congress enacted the NEA in order to establish a comprehensive national energy policy. The NEA was designed to improve
the conservation and efficient use of the nation's energy resources
through the promotion of alternative energy technologies, including

33. 3 Pu.

UTi,. REP. GUIDE at 2 (1983).

34. 5 Pun. UTn. REP. GuiDE at 1 (1983).
35. 41 Stat. 1077 (1920) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-825
(1982)). See generally R. BAUMri, THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION AND STATE
UTILITY REGULATION (1942).

36. See Note, supra note 5, at 153.
37. The NEA consists of five separate acts. See infra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text.
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cogeneration.3 The NEA is actually five acts, each with the goal
of improving energy conservation and fuel usage efficiency. Its
five separate acts are: PURPA; the Energy Tax Act (ETA);3 9 the
National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA);4° the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA)4' and the National Gas
Policy Act (NGPA). 42
Of the five acts, only the ETA lacks provisions directed toward
cogeneration. PURPA focuses principally on the cogeneration marketplace, while the other three acts address selected obstacles to
cogeneration's use. The FUA and the NGPA are aimed at easing
industry regulations when more efficient cogeneration systems are
employed. 43 Similarly, the NGPA provides an exemption for co-44
generators from the incremental pricing requirements of the Act.
The NECPA also encourages cogeneration by providing discretionary grants for cogeneration projects attached to schools and
4
hospitals. 1
PURPA was the centerpiece for cogeneration in the NEA. 46 It
was designed to remove three significant obstacles in the cogen-

38. See supra note 12.
39. Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
40. Pub. L. No. 95-6198, 92 Stat. 3026 (1978) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of titles 15, 42, and 49 U.S.C.).
41. Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 stat. 3289 (codified in scattered sections of
titles 5, 15, 16, 42, and 49 U.S.C.)
42. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of titles 15 and 42 U.S.C.).
43. The FUA, for example, originally gave the Secretary of Energy the
power to exempt cogenerators from its prohibition against electric utilities burning
oil or natural gas as a primary fuel. 42 U.S.C. § 8302(10)(c) (1978). However,
this prohibition has been repealed. See infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
Under the FUA, cogenerators continue to be exempt under the FUA from
regulations governing large oil or gas-fired projects. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8322(c),
8352(c) (West Supp. 1989). See infra notes 255-63 and accompanying text.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 3346(c)(3) (1982). See 45 Fed. Reg. 38,080 (1980).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6371(2)(k), 6371e (1982). One commentator notes that
"[s]ince cogeneration projects were only one type of project among many
competing for the limited funds available in this program, the chief virtue of
this provision probably was that it highlighted a new congressional awareness
and approval of cogeneration." Wooster, supra note 3, at 718.
46. Congress listed three broad goals in enacting PURPA: (1) conservation
of electric energy; (2) increasing the efficient use of utility facilities and resources;
and (3) encouraging equitable rates for electric consumers. H.R. CoNy. REP. No.
1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN.
NEws 7797, 7803. Although most of the controversy surrounding the implemen-
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eration marketplace: (1) the refusal of utilities to purchase electricity produced by independent cogenerators; (2) the charging by
utilities of discriminatorily high rates for back-up service required

by cogenerators; 47 and (3) the risk that cogenerators would be
subjected to inhibiting federal and state utility regulation in providing electricity to utilities. 48 Congress granted the FERC authority
49
to adopt regulations implementing PURPA.
B.

Constitutionality of PURPA
PURPA withstood constitutional challenge in FERC v. Missis-

sippi,5 0 which confirmed congressional power to enact PURPA

under the commerce clause. After Mississippi promulgated regulations implementing PURPA, the state and the Mississippi Public

Service Commission sued the FERC, challenging the constitutionality of titles 15 and 11152 and section 21053 of PURPA. These
sections require state utility commissions to consider the federal
standards for both retail electric rates and agreements between
utilities and qualifying facilities (QFs). Mississippi argued that these

provisions exceeded congressional commerce clause power, and
invaded tenth amendment state sovereignty. The Supreme Court
upheld the validity of PURPA, and held that the challenged
sections did not violate either the commerce clause or the tenth
54

amendment.

tation of PURPA involves setting equitable rates for consumers (see infra notes
142-76), studies have also been conducted on whether PURPA has achieved its
conservation and efficiency goals. One study noted the "significant net reduction
in natural gas, oil, and coal use for electricity production attributable to the
presence of QFs [qualifying facilities] in the utility service areas analyzed."
Lennon & Meyers, Net Energy Use Impacts of PURPA Implementation, 121
PuB. Urn.. FORT., May 12, 1988, at 28, 36. As a cautionary note, this study

recommended continued supervision of cogenerators to ensure that PURPA's
goals are met in the future. Id. at 38.
47. Back-up power is "electric energy or capacity supplied by an electric
utility to replace energy ordinarily generated by a facility's own generation
equipment during an unscheduled outage of the facility." 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(a)(9)
(1988).
48. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,214-15 (1980).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (1982).
50. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
51. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-45 (1982).
52. Retail Policies for Natural Gas Utilities, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201-11 (1982).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982).
54. 456 U.S. at 771.
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The Court agreed that Congress had the power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate electric utilities in intrastate commerce. 5 In enacting PURPA, Congress found that the regulated
activities of generation, sale, and transmission of electric power
"have an immediate effect on interstate commerce.' '56 The Court
applied the judicial standard for determining the validity of con57 "A court
gressional findings as enunciated in Hodel v. Indiana:
may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only
if it is clear that . .. there is no reasonable connection between
58

the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends."
The Court indicated that "federal regulation of intrastate power
transmission may be proper because of the interstate nature of the
generation and supply of electric power." 5 9 After reviewing the

legislative history of PURPA, 60 the Court held that limited regulation of both retail sales of electricity and of transactions between
QFs and utilities was a rational means of encouraging
energy
61
conservation and an efficient use of natural resources.
The tenth amendment issue divided the Court. Justice Blackmun, writing for a 5-4 majority, stated that section 210 of PURPA
did "nothing more than pre-empt conflicting state enactments in
the traditional way." 6 2 The majority upheld the section 201 requirement, stating that state commissions should implement federal
regulations when resolving disputes between utilities and QFs:
This form of dispute resolution was traditionally used by the
Mississippi Public Service Commission. 4 The Court emphasized
that the federal government has the power to enlist state branches
of government to further federal ends. 65
Finally, the majority held that PURPA did not affect the states
in their sovereign capacity or threaten their "separate and inde-

55. Id. at 753-58.
56. Id. at 755. See 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982).
57. 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
58. Id. at 323-24.
59. 456 U.S. at 755 (citing Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power &
Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972)).
60. The legislative history reflects the Congressional finding that the present
system of energy production was inefficient. See S.REP. No. 442, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7, 9 (1977); S.REP. No. 361, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1977).
61. 456 U.S. at 758.
62. Id. at 759.
63. Id. at 760.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 762 (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947)).
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Since Congress could clearly "pre-empt the

States completely in the regulation of retail sales by electricity and
gas utilities and in the regulation of transactions between such
utilities and cogenerators," 67 PURPA could "condition continued

state involvement in68 a pre-emptible area on the consideration of
federal proposals."

C. FERC Regulations

The FERC regulations implementing PURPA are important to

a cogenerator. The regulations directly address three responsibilities
of cogenerators and utilities: (1) the cogeneration market (purchases

and sales, back-up power, and electric utility regulation); (2) qualifying criteria; and (3) interconnection and wheeling. The regulations pertaining to purchases and sales and to interconnection and
wheeling are briefly noted here and discussed more extensively in
the state implementation section below.
1.

Market Regulation

Congress recognized that in order to grow, cogenerators needed
a guaranteed market for cogenerated power. PURPA requires
utilities to purchase excess electricity from cogenerators if the

purchase rate: is reasonable to the utilities' other electric consumers; is in the public interest; does not discriminate against the
cogenerator; and does not exceed the utility's incremental cost of
alternative electric energy. 69 The determination of standards for
reasonable rates was left to the FERC, which in turn passed the
responsibility to state commissions. 70 PURPA did not define the

66. Id. at 765 (citing Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76 (1869)).
67. Id. at 759.
68. Id. at 765. Justices Powell and O'Connor dissented from the tenth
amendment holding. Justice Powell argued that PURPA imposed a great burden
on the states to adopt certain administrative and judicial functions. Id. at 771
(Powell, J. dissenting). He found that PURPA conflicted with the concept of
federalism and therefore violated the tenth amendment. Id. at 772. Justice
O'Connor argued vigorously that PURPA invaded state sovereignty by mandating
action by the states, intruded upon state decision-making power, and affected
the traditional state function of utility regulation. Id. at 779-81 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). These factors led her to conclude that the challenged sections of
PURPA were invalid. Id. at 797.
69. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (1982).
70. One commentator notes that "[a]lthough delegation of [the ratemaking]
responsibility to the states permits local conditions to be taken into account, it
also effectively sidesteps the necessity of solving at the federal level the difficult
rate-setting problems presented by the statute." Pratt, supra note 2, at 499.
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pivotal terms "just and reasonable" or "discriminate. ' 71 The
definition of "incremental cost of alternative energy," (otherwise
known as "avoided cost") 72 was broadly described as the cost to
the electric utility of the electric energy that, but for the purchase
from the cogenerator, would be generated or purchased from
another source. 73 The FERC did, however, mandate that the states
adopt a "full avoided cost" standard, 74 which requires state commissions to engage in lengthy proceedings in order to satisfy
PURPA's mandatory purchase requirement.
PURPA and the implementing regulations require utilities to
sell back-up power to cogenerators. 75 This requirement can be
waived if it impairs the utility's ability to render adequate service
to its customers or if the requirement places an undue burden on
the utility? 6 PURPA sought to remedy discriminatorily high backup rates by requiring these rates to be "just and reasonable to the
electric consumers of the electric utility and in the public interest,"
and nondiscriminatory toward cogenerators. 77 In the context of
back-up power, "just and reasonable" rates are defined as rates
equal to those paid by traditional electric service users .7
The FERC followed PURPA's directive by promulgating rules
exempting qualifying cogenerators from both federal and state
utility regulations. 79 This is based on the premise that cogeneration
promotes free market competition among electric suppliers. Accordingly, controls designed to check monopolization are not appropriate to cogeneration.
2. Qualifying Facilities
Under the FERC regulations, PURPA applies only to qualifying cogeneration facilities (QFs), 0 which meet minimum oper71. See id. at n.40.
72. For a complete discussion of the components of avoided cost, see infra
notes 152-79 and accompanying text.
73. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d) (1982).
74. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,222-23 (1980), codified at 18 CFR 292.304 (a), (b)

(1988).

75. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a) (1988). See supra note 47 for the definition of
back-up power.
76. Id. § 292.305(b)(2).

77. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(c) (1982).

78. See Pratt, supra note 2, at 500.
79. Qualifying cogenerators are exempt from regulations of the Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and the Public
Utility Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1982). Additional legislation
exempts cogenerators from state regulation of utilities. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)
(1982); see 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.601-.602 (1988).
80. 18 C.F.R. § 292.203(b) (1988).
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2

The

cogenerator must satisfy the QF standard in order to fully access
the surplus power marketplace.
Operating and efficiency standards differ for topping-cycle
(power first)83 and bottoming-cycle (heat first)8 facilities. Toppingcycle systems must have useful yearly thermal energy output of at
least five percent of the total energy output. 5 Efficiency standards
apply only if any of the energy output is natural gas or oil and if
the installation began on or after March 13, 1980.86 Bottomingcycle facilities have no thermal energy standards and, as with
topping-cycle systems, there
are no efficiency standards unless
87
natural gas or oil is used.

81. Id. § 292.205. "The efficiency standard was imposed to meet the
concerns of those who felt that encouraging oil and gas cogeneration was counter
to other provisions of the National Energy Act." Wooster, supra note 3, at 723.
82. 18 C.F.R. § 292.206. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
83. Topping-cycle facilities are defined as cogenerators "in which the energy
input to the facility is first used to produce useful power output, and the reject
heat from power production is then used to provide useful thermal energy." 18
C.F.R. § 292.202(d) (1988).
84. Bottoming-cycle facilities are defined as cogenerators "in which the
energy input to the system is first applied to a useful thermal energy process,
and the reject heat emerging from the process is then used for power production."
Id. § 292.202(e).
85. Id. § 292.205(a)(1). This low 5% operating standard has stirred much
debate. Critics of the standard argue that it is being abused by cogenerators who
enter the market to produce electricity instead of following PURPA's goal of
making their own manufacturing process more efficient. These facilities, called
"PURPA machines," use only small amounts of steam for industrial or commercial purposes and use the remainder for electricity production. Although
PURPA machines do not differ substantially from electric utility power plants,
they qualify for the same benefits as those cogenerators that actually achieve
meaningful energy conservation. It is argued that because PURPA encourages
efficient fuel usage the FERC should not allow all cogenerators to take advantage
of the legislation. Only those facilities meeting PURPA's goals should receive
qualifying status. See House PURPA Report, supra note 8, at 610-12 (statement
of Pacific Gas & Electric Co.); Polsky, Cogeneration Versus Generation, 115
PUB. Urn. FORT., May 30, 1985, at 20. But ef. Written Testimony of the Nat'l
Indep. Energy Producers Before FERC, Docket No. RM87-12-000, Mar. 23, 1987
[hereinafter Written Testimony of NIEP] (operating and efficiency standards are
"generally satisfactory." Id. at 45-52).
86. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(a)(2) (1988). The applicable efficiency standard in
this case is no less than 42.5% if the thermal energy output is 15% or more,
and no less than 45% if it is under 15%. Id. § 292.205(a)(2)(A)(B).
87. Id. § 292.205(b)(2). If natural gas or oil is used, the plant's efficiency
must be at least 45%. Id. § 292.205(b)(1).
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The ownership criteria is designed to promote the development

of cogeneration independent of the utility industry. A QF "may
not be owned by a person primarily engaged in the generation or

sale of electric power (other than electric power solely from the
cogeneration facilities ... )."8

A person is primarily engaged in

the sale of electricity "if more than 50 percent of the equity
interest in the facility is held by an electric utility or utilities, or
by an electric utility holding company, . . . or any combination
thereof ..... ,9 The ownership criteria has been alternatively crit-

icized for not sufficiently encouraging utility ownership, and for
granting the utilities too much participation in cogeneration pro-

jects. 90

88. Id. § 292.206(a).
89. Id. § 292.206(b). The FERC has effectively relaxed the 50% ownership
requirement with respect to partnerships. Ultrapower 3, 27 F.E.R.C. (P) 61,094
(1984), involved a general partnership consisting of Ultrapower 3, Inc. and Rincon
Investing Co., a subsidiary of Ultrapower 3. Rincon was classified as an "electric
utility" under the Federal Power Act. Under the terms of a joint venture
agreement between the companies, Rincon's capital contribution accounted for
two-thirds of the partnership's total contributions. However, management positions and any interest in the venture profits or losses was split equally between
the parties. The FERC noted its regulations equated "ownership interest" with
"equity interest." Id. at 61,183. Therefore, the FERC was faced with the issue
of how to define equity interest in such a partnership. Id.
In the FERC's view, "the entitlement to venture profits, losses, and surplus
after return of initial capital contribution, as well as the fact that both partners
share equal control of the venture, is dispositive." Id. at 61,184. As such, the
commission focused on the "stream of benefits" from the venture to determine
the partners' equity interest. Id.
Since "Rincon's control of the partnership and entitlement to benefits do
not exceed 50%," the FERC found that "Rincon has no more than a 50%
equity interest in Ultrapower 3 and that the ownership criteria of section 292.206"
was satisfied. Id.
Although Ultrapower 3 specifically dealt with a small power production
facility, the same stream of benefits test has been applied to cogeneration facilities.
See Ultrapower, Inc., 46 F.E.R.C. (P) 61,380 (1989); CMS Midland, Inc., 38
F.E.R.C. (P) 61, 244 (1987).
90. Critics of the ownership criteria argue:
Section 210 of PURPA, the only provision directly aimed at influencing
utility behavior with respect to decentralized power, forces utilities to
cooperate with their competitors, at little gain to the utilities. .

.

. [B]y

giving utilities incentives to become active 'partners' with private producers in the decentralized power enterprise, its maximum development
will be best assured.
Note, supra note 2, at 321, 332.
Proponents of the criteria argue that state commissions have inadequate
resources to properly supervise the industry if utilities are allowed to own greater
than 50% of the equity interest in a QF. See House PURPA Report, supra note
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Interconnection and Wheeling

The FERC regulations require utilities to interconnect with QFs
for the purchase and sale of power, but utilities are not obligated
to wheel electric power from QFs to other utilities or purchasers. 9'
Utilities objected to interconnection on the basis of cost, safety,
and competition. 92 The FERC found that the cost of interconnection was the only legitimate problem. 93 To alleviate this problem,
the FERC ruled that QFs may interconnect if they pay "any
interconnection costs which the State regulatory authority ... or
nonregulated utility may assess ... on a nondiscriminatory basis."

' 94

The FERC originally assumed a passive stance on wheeling,93
stating that "if a QF agrees, an electrical utility which would
otherwise be obligated to purchase energy or capacity may transmit" to another utility; however, transmission costs may not be
included in the purchase price.9 6 Independent electrical producers
argue that the FERC, in order to assist QFs, should require
wheeling, 97 and establish a procedure for determining equitable
wheeling rates. 9 Such measures, it is argued, would assure adequate
access and reasonable rates. Utilities oppose mandatory wheeling,
asserting that it would have a detrimental effect on the system's
reliability, economic efficiency, and adequacy of electric power
supply. 9

8, at 55, 65-66 (testimony of the Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs).
Additionally, proponents urge that increased utility involvement might adversely
affect ratepayers and other QFs. Id. at 419 (testimony of Jan Hamrin for the
Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n, et al.).
91. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(c)(2) (1988).
92. "Although the purported basis for this refusal [to interconnect] was to
avoid system operating problems, it more likely was a tactical aspect of utility
hostility to cogenerators." Pratt, supra note 2, at 508 (footnote omitted).
93. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,229-30 (1980).
94. 18 C.F.R. § 292.306(a) (1988).
95. The FERC's position on the rates, terms, and conditions of wheeling
has since changed dramatically. The Commission has asserted exclusive and
preemptive control of these aspects of interstate wheeling. See infra notes 19597 and accompanying text.
96. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(d) (1988).
97. Written Testimony of NIEP, supra note 85, at 55.
98. Id. at 52. See also House PURPA Report, supra note 8, at 482, 493
(comments of the Nat'l Ass'n of Energy Serv. Cos. (NAESCO)).
99. For a more extensive discussion of the reliability issue, see infra note
176.
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Validity of FERC Regulations

In American Electric Power Service Corp. v. FERC,1°° the
petitioners challenged the validity of the regulations the FERC
promulgated to implement PURPA. Petitioners, three public util-

ities, specifically challenged four regulations: (1) the FERC's "full
avoided cost rule" for utility purchases of QF power; 01 (2) the
FERC's "simultaneous transaction rule" for metering purchases
and sales to and from QFs; 10 2 (3) the FERC's grant of blanket

authority to cogenerators to interconnect with utilities without

meeting the requirements of sections 210103 and 2120 4 of the Federal
Power Act; l05 and (4) the FERC's failure to adopt fuel use criteria

in determining qualifying facilities. 106

The court of appeals upheld only the simultaneous transaction

rule and the fuel use criteria. 0 7 The simultaneous transaction rule,
which the FERC intended to apply only to new facilities, gives an
industrial cogenerator the option of selling all of its output to a
utility and simultaneously purchasing all of its needs from the
same utility. 10 8 This practice is permitted when a utility needs
additional capacity, and one of its customers can build and operate

a new cogeneration facility more cheaply than the utility could

build and operate its own facility. 109 Petitioners in American Elec-

100. 675 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd in part sub nom., American
Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402 (1983).
101. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2) (1988).
102. Id. § 292.303(e). "
103. 16 U.S.C. § 824i (1982).
104. Id. § 824k (1982).
105. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(4) (1988).
106. Id. § 292.204.
107. 675 F.2d at 1245-46.
108. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(4) (1988).
109. See 44 Fed. Reg. 38,870 (1979). The FERC explained that the simultaneous transaction rule was only intended to apply to this situation, as "it would
be in everyone's interest for the QF to build the unit." Id. However, if the
utility's costs in constructing a facility for additional capacity would be lower
than the required avoided cost payments to the QF, the FERC felt it would be
best for the utility to build the plant itself and supply its own needs. Id.
The FERC stated that the simultaneous transaction rule should not apply to
existing facilities that already supplied some of their own power needs since
allowing industrial cogenerators to sell power at avoided cost and to purchase
power at the retail rate would constitute a windfall to the cogenerator. This
would not be in the public interest, as it "would drive up the costs of power to
the utility's other customers without doing anything to encourage new cogeneration. . .

."

Id. at 38,871.
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tric argued first, that allowing the fictional purchase and sale
violated section 210(a) of PURPA, 110 and second, that the FERC
did not adequately explain its decision to employ the fiction.
The court rejected both of these arguments, reasoning that
Congress did not intend narrow definitions of "purchase" and
"sale" that would treat cogenerators consuming all generated
power differently than cogenerators selling excess power."' Noting
the reluctance of utilities to purchase electric power from cogenerators or to adopt appropriate rates, the court determined that
2
the FERC should exercise a great deal of deference in this area."
The court found that the FERC had sufficiently explained and
considered the issues, and allowed the simultaneous transaction
rule to stand.'
The court also upheld the lack of fuel use criteria. The petitioners had argued that section 201114 of PURPA required the
FERC to include fuel use standards in the regulations. However,
after reviewing the wording of the statute, the intent of the
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, and PURPA's stated
goals, the court concluded that the FERC had the discretion to
omit fuel use requirements. 5

110. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (1982).
111. 675 F.2d at 1237-38.
112. Id. at 1238.
113. Id.
114. 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)(B) (1982) provides in pertinent part: " 'Qualifying
cogeneration facility' means a cogeneration facility which - (i) the Commission
determines, by rule, meets such requirements (including requirements respecting
minimum size, fuel use, and fuel efficiency) as the Commission may, by rule
prescribe ....

.

115. 675 F.2d at 1245. Section 201 contains the word "may" instead of
"must" in dealing with the creation of fuel use criteria. Id. at 1241. The court
agreed with the FERC that Congress did not intend to exclude oil and gas-fired
cogenerators from QF status. If Congress did intend this exclusion, the statute
would have contained such a restriction, as it did for small power producers. Id.
See 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(A)(i) (1982).
The lack of fuel use standards was also consistent with the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 8302(7), (10) (1982). The court
reasoned that Congress could not have intended to require fuel use standards for
cogenerators under PURPA, since these facilities were already exempt from fuel
use criteria under the FUA. 675 F.2d at 1242. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 8322(c), 8522(c)
(1982).
The court held that any application of fuel use standards would run counter
to PURPA's express purpose to increase the utilities' efficient use of facilities
and resources, and that the FERC's consideration of the fuel use issue was
reasoned and adequate. 675 F.2d at 1242.

1070

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1051

The court struck down the FERC's full avoided cost rule as
inconsistent with PURPA's language requiring sales rates for QF
11 6
power to be "just and reasonable" and "in the public interest.
The court also vacated the FERC's regulations with respect to
interconnection. 1 7 By requiring "any" utility to interconnect with
"any" cogenerator, the FERC essentially exempted QFs from
procedural and substantive requirements under sections 210118 and
212119 of the Federal Power Act, and also deprived utilities of the

Act's safeguards.

20

The FERC appealed the full avoided cost and interconnection
rulings, and the Supreme Court unanimously reversed both lower
court holdings.'12 The Court first noted that the court of appeals
employed the incorrect standard of review in evaluating the FERC
regulations.1 The lower court used the "substantial evidence"
standard; instead, it should have determined whether the FERC
rule was " 'arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.' "123

Section 210 of PURPA requires utilities to pay QFs a rate that
is just and reasonable to the electric utility's consumers, in the
public interest, and non-discriminatory. 24 Since the full avoided
cost rule is nondiscriminatory towards QFs, the Court focused
only on whether the FERC adequately explained why the full

116. 675 F.2d at 1232. The court stated that Congress clearly distinguished
a just and reasonable rate from a rate based on full avoided cost. Id. at 1233.
Although the FERC might have been justified in choosing this maximum rate,
the court held that the Commission must fully justify and explain its rationale
in light of the competing interests of cogenerators, electric utility consumers, and
the general public. Id. at 1236.
117. Id. at 1238-41. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(c)(1) (1988).
118. 16 U.S.C: §§ 824i(a)(i), (b), (c) (1982).
119. Id.§ 824k.
120. 675 F.2d at 1239. The FERC argued that strict compliance with these
requirements "would impose an undue burden on cogenerators." The court
disagreed, holding that the FERC had no authority to grant exemptions from
sections 210 and 212 of the Federal Power Act, and that Congress must mandate
any changes in procedures. Id. at 1240.
121. American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461
U.S. 402 (1983).
122. Id. at 412 n.7. The "substantial evidence" standard requires that the
agency decision be supported by a substantial factual basis. Id.
123. Id. at 412 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982)). This standard of
review is more deferential to the agency's determinations and will invalidate a
regulation only if the agency has not adequately considered the relevant factors
and has committed "a clear error of judgment." Id. at 413 (citing Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
124. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (1982).
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avoided cost rule is just and reasonable and in the public interest.2'
First, the Court rejected the utilities' suggestion that "just and26
reasonable" be equated with the lowest possible reasonable rate.
After reviewing PURPA's legislative history, the Court determined
that since Congress intended to further alternative energy technologies, traditional rate-making concepts should not apply.2 7 Therefore, the FERC could set a rate that provided a significant incentive
to cogenerators. This type of rate would benefit the public
through
8
the conservation and efficient use of energy resources.'
The Court noted that the full avoided cost standard is not
totally inflexible. Waivers can be granted, 129 or QFs and utilities
can negotiate a contract at less than full avoided cost. 30 Since the
Court found it reasonable for the FERC to set the maximum rate,
it concluded the regulation was not arbitrary and, therefore, was
valid.1'
The Court upheld the FERC's interconnection rule, noting that
the FERC had the power to require utilities to physically connect
with cogenerators, as "[n]o purchase or sale of electricity can be
completed without an interconnection between the buyer and the
seller.' ' 32 The utilities argued that PURPA section 210(e) 33 required evidentiary hearings by the FERC on a case-by-case basis
to determine if interconnection would be required. The Court
rejected this argument, reasoning that holding such hearings for
every interconnection would "paralyze" the development of cogeneration. 34 The interconnection rule does not immunize QFs
from the requirements of sections 210 and 212 of the Federal
Power Act obligating cogenerators to obey an interconnection
order. 35 Instead, the interconnection rule merely requires other
parties, namely electric utilities, to interconnect. 3 6 The FERC's

125. 461 U.S. at 413-14.
126. Id. at 414.

127. Id.
128. Id. at 415.
129. Id. at 416. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.403 (1988).
130. 461 U.S. at 416. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.301(b)(1) (1988).
131. 461 U.S. at 417-18.

132. Id. at 418.
133. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (1982).
134. 461 U.S. at 421 (citing Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, A.G.,
332 U.S. 480, 489 (1947) (hearing requirement would "impute to Congress a
purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to promote with the other").
135. Id. at 421-22. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824i, 824k (1982 and Supp. IV 1986).
136. 461 U.S. at 421-22.
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rule was a reasonable and therefore valid interpretation of the
37
statute.
E.

State Implementation of PURPA
1.

In General

This discussion summarizes the different implementation methods adopted by various states to satisfy the FERC regulations.38
The FERC allowed the states one year to implement PURPA.

137. Id. at 423.
138. 18 C.F.R. § 292.401(a) (1988). Implementation of PURPA was often
difficult. Conflicts between utilities, cogenerators, and regulators were common
as all parties struggled toward fair and equitable solutions. For example, one
participant noted:
State-by-state implementation of PURPA is both a strength and a
problem. Implementation of PURPA to achieve the desired results is
neither simple nor is it a "one shot process." The regulators, utilities,
and intervenors must be very thoughtful and sophisticated in their
development of a QF program if it is to be effective ....
PURPA implementation ... is no small feat.

Effective

House PURPA Report, supra note 8, at 409-10 (statement of Jan Hamrin for
the Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n and the Indep. Energy Producers Forum).
Many utilities, hostile to the benefits granted to cogenerators within the
existing electric power system, argued against the expanded use of QFs. The
utilities emphasized that cogenerators lack any obligation to serve the public, and
they stressed the potential negative impacts of this lack of obligation on the
utility's ratepayers:
The bottom line is that both the utility and its ratepayers are subjected
to greater risks. The performance and persistence of QFs, especially
across a wide range of general economic conditions, is not the same as
a utility's, nor is it well understood. A QF's obligations to the public
are contractual and relatively limited. On the other hand, a utility's
obligations are more extensive and established by a totally different
body of laws and regulations. If a QF's economics turn sour, the QF
can simply stop supplying power and suffer a comparatively limited
economic loss. But such an option is not available to the public utility.
Thus, as QF power assumes a larger share of total production, ratepayers
will be involuntarily assuming more risks as they unwittingly participate
in an experimental modification of the traditional electric utility structure
and with it the traditional service obligation.
Implementation of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 Before the
Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 108, 14041 (1986) [hereinafter Senate PURPA Hearings] (statement of Michael R. Peevey,
E ecutive Vice President, Southern Calif. Edison Co.).
Another problem related to the QFs' lack of obligation to serve is the
possibility that QFs can increase their profitability by gauging production and
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The states had three major responsibilities: (1) to establish rates
for the purchase of electric power from QFs,' 3 9 for the sale of
electricity to QFs,14° and for the sale of supplementary, back-up,
maintenance, and interruptible power from utilities to QFs; 14 1 (2)
to maintain interconnection conditions, including required operational standards and the costs to QFs;142 and (3) to satisfy data
filing requirements that allowed potential QFs to determine the
potential avoided cost rate likely paid by utilities.143 State commissions could: (1) issue their own regulations pursuant to the
FERC guidelines; (2) resolve conflicts between utilities and QFs;
or (3) take whatever action was reasonably necessary.'4
2.

Purchase of QF Power

To encourage the development of cogeneration, the FERC set
the rate for utility purchases of QF power at the full avoided cost
to the utility. However, individual states can set purchase rates
below full avoided cost if the lower rate would be just and
reasonable, in the public interest, and nondiscriminatory toward

sales to utilities based on certain high demand load periods. One utility executive
stated: "Allowing cogenerators to serve selective 'premium' loads would result
in higher costs for the remaining retail and residential customers, who are the
very people that traditional public utility regulation protects." Id. at 50 (statement
of D.E. Simmons, Group Vice President - Power Operations, Houston Lighting
& Power Co).
Utilities also disagree with the notion that the addition of cogenerators to
the electric power market will benefit consumers by stimulating greater competition in the supply of power:
What PURPA does is create a two-tiered market wherein a privileged
set of participants (i.e., QFs) are given the opportunity of earning an
unregulated return by guaranteeing them a purchaser for the sale of
their output at an administratively determined price. In effect, we have
"deregulated" a small set of sellers by imposing a new set of regulatory
burdens on the buyer. It is difficult to conceptualize this arrangement
as constituting a "competitive market" or having anything to do with
the economist's notion of competition ....
"Yardstick competition" is
a questionable concept in theory and is totally irrelevant in practice
unless all market participants are operating on a level playing field. This
is certainly not the case under the PURPA model.
Id. at 46 (statement of D.E. Simmons).
139. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a) (1988).
140. Id. § 292.305(a).
141. Id. § 292.305(b).
142. Id. §§ 292.306, .308.
143. Id. §§ 292.302(b)(1-3).
144. Id. § 292.401(a).
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QFs.' 45 A full avoided cost standard is also unnecessary when a
QF and a utility mutually agree to a different rate. 46 Additionally,
the FERC has allowed the waiver of purchase obligations when
the goals of PURPA would not be compromised.1 47
Jurisdictions have split on the question of whether a state can

require utilities to pay more than the avoided cost rate for its

mandatory purchases. 4s New York, for example, has approved a
minimum rate for utility purchases that applies even when the

utility's avoided cost falls below that minimum.149 Similarly, Ore-

145. Id. § 292.304(3).
146. Id. § 292.301(b). State regulatory commissions can also secure waivers
from the FERC full avoided cost standard. See id. § 292.403.
147. Oglethorpe Power Corp. et. al., 32 F.E.R.C. (P) 61,103 (1985), reh'g
granted in part, 35 F.E.R.C. (P) 61,069 (1986), aff'd sub nom., Greensboro
Lumber Co. v. FERC, 825 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
In Oglethorpe, a rural electric cooperative in Georgia sold power at wholesale
to its member co-ops, which distributed the electricity at retail. The individual
retail co-ops (EMCs) wanted to avoid purchasing cogenerated power from QFs
by allowing the wholesale generation and transmission facility (Oglethorpe) to
purchase all the QF power. The Commission allowed the waiver of the purchase
obligation by the individual retail co-ops. It was much more economical for
Oglethorpe to coordinate all of the purchases than to burden each retailer with
the costs of providing an administrative staff to handle the transactions. 32
F.E.R.C. (P) 61,103, at 61,285-86. The goals of PURPA were not compromised
under such an arrangement, since QFs were still guaranteed a market for their
power. Id. at 61,285. Therefore, the waiver of the purchase obligation was
granted. Id. at 61,287.
On rehearing, a waiver of the sale obligation was also granted. 35 F.E.R.C.
(P) 61,069, at 61,137. Oglethorpe was allowed to waive its obligation to sell
power to QFs, on the condition that the EMCs agreed to sell to the QFs all their
required back-up and maintenance power. Since this guaranteed that QFs could
obtain back-up service, the waiver was granted. Id at 61,138.
The United States Court of Appeals upheld the waivers of both obligations,
deferring to the FERC's reasonable interpretations of its regulations. 825 F.2d
at 523.
148. The Supreme Court has refused to resolve this issue on the basis of a
lack of a substantial federal question. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 63 N.Y.2d 424, 472 N.E.2d 981, 483 N.Y.S.2d 153, (1983), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1075 (1985).
149. In approving a purchase rate that exceeds avoided cost in some instances, the New York Appellate Division court reversed a lower court decision
invalidating the state's six cent per kilowatt hour minimum purchase rate.
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n 98 A.D.2d 377, 471 N.Y.S.2d
684 (1983). The lower court had found the rate invalid for three reasons. First,
the court reasoned that PURPA and the Federal Power Act preempted the area;
therefore, the FERC had exclusive rate-setting jurisdiction. Id. at 381-84, 471
N.Y.S.2d at 688-90. Second, it felt that there was not a proper consideration of
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gon has set a purchase rate in excess of avoided cost. 15 0 Kansas,
on the other hand, has held
that utility purchase rates may not
51

exceed full avoided cost. '

Determination of the actual avoided cost is based on several

factors, including the QF's power availability during peak periods,
the QF's reliability, the ability of the QF and utility to schedule
outages, and the existence of a legally enforceable obligation to
provide power. 52 The FERC has indicated it would approve most
methods for calculating purchase rates, as long as they reasonably
account for the utilities' avoided cost and still provide an incentive
for cogeneration.'53 Some states have adopted rates proposed by

individual utilities, while54 others have promulgated standards to

determine avoided cost.
Two components comprise avoided cost: energy and capacity.
The energy component or "energy credit" reflects the utility's fuel
costs and the associated operational and maintenance costs avoided

the rate savings to the consumers. Id. at 383, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 689. Finally, the
court relied on the legislative history, which stated that avoided cost was to be
the upper limit for purchase rates. Id.
New York's highest court reversed, finding "no direct conflict" between
PURPA's avoided cost purchase rate and the state commission's higher rate. 63
N.Y.2d 424, 435, 472 N.E.2d 981, 985, 483 N.Y.S.2d 153, 157 (1984). The state
and federal laws were viewed as complementary, allowing the states to provide
added incentives to cogeneration by setting higher rates. 63 N.Y.2d at 435 n.8,
472 N.E.2d at 985 n.8, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 157 n.8. (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 12,221
(1980)). The court also stated that the effects of such a rate on consumers were
balanced by the more important purpose of encouraging cogeneration. 63 N.Y.2d
at 437, 472 N.E.2d at 986-87, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 157. The court noted that the
upper limit language relied on by the lower court applied only to one section of
PURPA, and reasoned that this restriction implied that states were free to set
their own requirements to encourage cogeneration. 63 N.Y.2d at 435, 472 N.E.2d
at 985, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
150. See Hagler, Utility Purchases of Decentralized Power: The PURPA
Scheme, 5 STANi.ENvmL. L.J. 154, 163 (1983).
151. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Kansas Corp. Comm'n, 234 Kan.
1052, 1058, 676 P.2d 764, 768 (1984). The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that
the federal government had preempted this area. Since avoided cost is a maximum
rate of purchase under the federal regulations, the state may not require rates in
excess of this maximum absent a waiver or other contractual agreement. Id. at
1054-57, 676 P.2d at 765-68.
152. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (1988).
153. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,222 (1980).
154. See Charo, Stearns & Mallory, Alternative Energy Power Production:
The Impact of the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act, 11 CoLUM. J. ENmTL.
L. 447, 463 (1986) [hereinafter Charo]; Wooster, supra note 3, at 737.
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by purchasing QF power. 5 5 The capacity component or "capacity
credit" measures the fixed capital cost of building a new power
plant that the utility avoids by purchasing QF power.' 56
a. The Energy Credit

Since the states acted independently, several major approaches
for determining the energy credit have emerged. 157 The "compo-

nent" or "peaker"

method uses detailed models to compute the

amount of energy required to produce a certain unit of electricity
and the fuel, maintenance, and operational costs associated with
that unit." 8 Expected QF power is factored into the model, re-

sulting in avoided energy cost estimates which can be differentiated

according to time and cost. 159 The advantage of the component
method is its ability to time-differentiate specific components of
avoided cost rather than arbitrarily choosing a representative proxy
unit. 16 However, the method has been criticized for using models
that are difficult to verify, and for not adequately reflecting long16

run avoided costs. '

Under the "differential revenue requirements" method, esti-

mates of a utility's generating costs with and without an amount
of QF operating capacity are calculated over a number of years.162
The result is a lump sum of avoided cost that can be divided

among energy and capacity costs. 16 Critics of this method note
155.

EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, BACKGROUND

COST PAYMENTS CALCULATED?

PURPA: How ARE

AVOIDED

(1987).

156. Id.
157. Each approach has a number of variations. See Parmesano, Avoided
Cost Payments to Qualifying Facilities: Debate Goes On, 120 PUB. UTiL. FORT.,
Sept. 17, 1987, at 34, 35-37.

158. Id. at 35; Wooster, supra note 3, at 737-38. Under a variation of the
component method, the "incremental heat rate" approach, a significant variable
is whether the projected cost or the historical average fuel cost is used. Wooster,
supra note 3, at 739. Wooster notes that Connecticut's use of the historical
average fuel cost results in a lower fuel credit than one calculated by California's
use of the projected estimated cost of fuel resources. Id. Another variable in

systems that cannot differentiate specific blocks of energy is determining which
incremental block should be used for calculations-the last incremental block of
energy or the next projected incremental block. Id. at 738-39.
159. Parmesano, supra note 157, at 35.

160. Id.
161. Id. at 36. Parmesano concludes that the component method is the best
way to determine avoided cost. Id.at 36-38.
162. Id. at 37.
163. Id.
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that it produces costs that cannot be easily time- and cost-differentiated for specific periods.' 64
A third approach, the "proxy system," uses the energy component of power purchased from a pool of cooperating utilities or
from another single resource as a proxy for the energy component.'6 5 The approach has the advantage of simplicity, as a previously determined figure can be applied to transactions between
the QF and the utility.' 66 The approach's disadvantage is that
"while lower cost cogenerators are brought on line first, an average
price between low cost and high cost cogenerators is charged,
resulting in savings that are split among pool members."' 67 Therefore, applying this middle ground rate might not truly reflect the
actual avoided energy component of purchasing cogenerated
16
power. 1
b.

The Capacity Credit

A capacity credit is appropriate only when a utility needs
capacity. The FERC has recently determined that only thirteen
1
states still have capacity needs and must provide capacity credits . 69

164. Id.
[A]lI the parameters of a particular utility system which have been
captured in the dispatch model can be taken into account in computing
avoided costs .... This advantage is somewhat illusory, however, since

the detailed output from a dispatch model is all dependent on the basic
parameters input to the model. .

.

. Since a utility's 20- to 30-year

resource plan typically contains speculative elements, the revenues required to finance such a plan are speculative.
Yokell & Marcus, Rate Making for Sales of Power to Electric Utilities, 114 PUB.
UT. FoRT., Aug. 2, 1984 at 21, 23.
165. Wooster, supra note 3, at 740, notes that Iowa and New Jersey use
this system. This method has also been adopted in some parts of Michigan. See
In re Midland Cogeneration Venture Limited Partnership, Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Case No. U-8871, (Jan. 31, 1989) at 48 (on file at The Wayne Law
Review).
166. Yokell & Marcus, supra note 164, at 23.
167. Parmesano, supra note 157, at 38; Wooster, supra note 3, at 740-41.
168. For example, utilities that purchased power from a pool argued to the
Connecticut commission that "their ratepayers would lose the savings that these
purchases permitted if the utilities were to forfeit this cheaper pool power and
pay avoided cost. . .

."

The state commission responded by permitting a 5%

reduction in the energy component paid by the utilities to reflect the pool savings
share. Wooster, supra note 3, at 741.
169. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Administrative Determination of Full
Avoided Costs, Sales to Qualifying Facilities, and Interconnection Facilities, 53
Fed. Reg. 9331 (FERC proposed Mar. 16, 1988) (1989) [hereinafter Avoided
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States use several approaches to calculate capacity credits. The
most common is the "unit specified" approach, under which the
state commission determines the conceptual cost of a new generating unit.170 This method only partially accounts for system-wide
savings that result from the QF's available power.' 7 1 The "differential revenue requirements" method is more accurate. 72 Under
this approach, an optimum generating development plan is formed,
which determines the difference between the capital cost of optimum capacity expansion with and without QFs. This difference
becomes the avoided capacity cost. 73 The disadvantage of this
approach is the difficulty of using and verifying the complex model
formulated to calculate the capital costs. 74
States offering capacity credits make payment conditional upon
the QF satisfying certain requirements, including: (1) entering into
firm contracts with utilities for delivering fixed capacity; 7 5 (2)

Cost NOPR]. Since PURPA has fostered an unprecedented boom in cogeneration,
many utilities are being overwhelmed by excess capacity. "'We have managed to
become so awash with excess qualifying facility capacity that, if electricity were
water, the Pacific Ocean would now be lapping at the Sierra Nevada Mountains."'
Remarkable Remarks, 120 PuB. UT. FORT., Dec. 10, 1987, at 9 (quoting Michael
R. Peevey, Executive Vice President, Southern California Edison Co.). The
NOPRs recently released by the FERC stipulate that capacity credits need not be
paid by utilities where capacity is not needed. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
170. Wooster, supra note 3, at 746.
171. Id. at 748.
172. Id. Both Texas and Maine have employed variations of this approach.
173. Charo, supra note 154, at 466.
174. See supra note 164.
175. The propriety of long-term firm contract prices has recently been
debated between utilities and cogenerators. One study called long term contracts
with no adjustment mechanisms "the greatest problem to date," because utility
customers are punished for past forecasts that cannot be corrected or adjusted
to meet present economic realities. Senate PURPA Hearings, supra note 138, at
283 (1986 report by Hagler, Bailly & Co. prepared for the United States Dept.
of Energy).
In response, it has been argued that such long-term contracts are the only
means of assuring the promotion of cogeneration by QFs. QFs must have some
stability before going ahead with energy production. Id. at 294-95 (statement of
Jan Hamrin, Executive Director, Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n and Chief
Executive Officer, Indep. Energy Producers Forum).
Utilities have attempted to attack such long-term contracts on several different
grounds, usually challenging the contract when the market price for energy falls
far below the contract price. See Pestle & Butler, State Legislation Can Help
Waste-to-Energy Projects, 3 SOLID WASTE & POWER, Apr. 1989, at 26. The
utilities' attacks include: (1) the direct assertion by the state commission of the
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meeting reliability standards for capacity;

76

(3) meeting minimum

authority to invalidate contract prices it finds unacceptable; (2) the limitation of
recovery to market price on the basis of the commission's general authority to
allow utilities to recover only 'prudently incurred costs'; and (3) the imposition
of a duty to renegotiate. Id. at 32.
Recently, "anti-cogeneration" rate contracts have been used to discourage
the development of cogeneration facilities. These contracts offer major customers
lower rates in exchange for an agreement by the customer not to construct or
install cogeneration equipment during the contract term. See Norris, Cogeneration
and Small Power Production:Recent Regulatory Developments, 119 PuB. UrM.
FoRT., June 25, 1987, at 47; Radford, Competition Heats Up After Repeal of
Fuel Use Restrictions for Cogeneration, 120 PuB. Urn.. FoRT., Aug. 20, 1987,
at 4. For example, the California Public Utilities Commission has approved a
number of anti-cogeneration contracts to avoid the uneconomic bypass of its
system. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., Resolution E-3017 (Cal. P.U.C. Jan. 28,
1987). The Commission reasoned that such agreements would provide electric
power at the same cost as cogenerated power, but would avoid the risks of
cogeneration. Id. Customers would also benefit by not having to pay the added
fixed costs arising from customers who developed cogeneration facilities leaving
the system. Id.
Similarly, the Arkansas Public Service Commission approved an anti-cogeneration rate contract in which the customer agreed to delay plans to build a
qualifying facility. The customer also provided the utility (with a five-year option)
its own or jointly owned cogeneration facility at a site close to the customer. Re
Arkansas Power and Light Co., 83 PUR4th 12 (Ark. P.S.C. 1987). The Arkansas
Commission reasoned that the loss of a major customer would increase costs to
other ratepayers, and the use of any cogenerated output would be unnecessary
excess capacity. Id. at 14-15.
The approval of these contracts is in direct conflict with the purposes behind
implementation of PURPA and its goals. It will be interesting to see the FERC's
reaction to such contracts.
176. The utility industry raises unreliability as a principal argument against
QFs. For example, the utilities point out that under adverse weather conditions
QFs go off line and do not immediately return, thereby changing load flow.
Senate PURPA Hearings,supra note 138, at 58, 64 (testimony of Logan Lanham,
Sr. Vice President of Pub. Affairs, Idaho Power Co.). QFs also detrimentally
affect reliability by upsetting schedules. Id. at 137 (statement of Michael R.
Peevey, Executive Vice President, Southern California Edison Co.).
Cogenerators counter that reliability problems do not exist. For example,
the Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON) has argued that QFs may
actually increase reliability because: (1) industrial cogenerators must be more
reliable in order to insure continuity of the manufacturing process; (2) since
cogeneration facilities are much smaller than utilities, outages affect only a small
percentage of generating capacity; (3) cogenerators provide efficient reactive power
close to the utility's system loads; and (4) industrial cogenerators can provide
back-up power in times of emergency. Id. at 702, 719-20 (statement of ELCON).
A public utilities commissioner noted that .'[p]roblems with traditional [generating] sources such as cost overruns, poor plant performance, and the resulting
fallout have made qualifying facilities very attractive as a way to meet new
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capacity requirements; 177
and (4) requiring peak hour production for
full capacity payment.
The projected need for capacity over the short and long term
is a critical issue. Capacity needs rise or fall depending upon a

utility's capital investment program, plant life, and market conditions. Credits can be divided into short- and long-term rates, 178
depending on when
capacity is needed, or averaged over the life
179
of the contract.
3. Sale of Power to Qualifying Facilities(QFs)
Rates for power sold to QFs must adhere to the FERC guide-

lines that require the rates to be just and reasonable, in the public

interest, and nondiscriminatory to QFs.8 0 In setting sale rates,
some states treat QFs like other customers with similar load
characteristics, and require both to pay the same retail rate. Other
states view QFs as constantly buying electricity from the utility
under simultaneous buy and sell transactions.18 1 Under this view,
when an outage at a QF causes utility purchases to fall, utility
sales to the QF remain constant. Therefore, rates for back-up and

demands."' Remarkable Remarks, 120 PuB. UTrL. FORT., Dec. 10, 1987, at 9
(quoting Stanley Hulett, President of the California Public Utilities Commission).
See also Senate PURPA Hearings, supra note 138, at 304-05 (testimony of Jan
Hamrin, Executive Director Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n and Chief Executive
Officer, Indep. Energy Producers Forum).
177. Wooster, supra note 3, at 751-52.
178. Dividing rates into short- and long-term components provides a fairer
measure of avoided capacity costs. Requiring a utility to pay capacity credits
where no capacity is needed forces the utility, and ultimately the consumer, to
pay for unnecessary capacity. See Howe, Cogeneration Rates: The Present and
the Future of Full Avoided Costs, 113 PuB. UTI. FORT., May 10, 1984, at 55,
56-57.
179. Levelized or average rates seek to remedy the situation in which a utility
needs capacity only during the first part of a long-term contract. The rates are
averaged and paid during the entire contract period, whether or not the capacity
costs actually exist. Howe, supra note 178, at 57. Such rates raise the question
of who should pay for future avoided costs - current consumers, or only future
consumers through a two-tier system. States have reached both conclusions. For
example, Washington held that only future ratepayers should pay for future
capacity costs. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Washington Water
Power Co., 56 PUR4th 615, 623-26 (1983). Idaho, on the other hand, allowed
the payment of future avoided cost by present ratepayers in light of the cogeneration benefits to all ratepayers. Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n Order No.
18744, Mar. 21, 1984.
180. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305(a) (1988).
181. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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supplementary power are unnecessary because the QFs are con-

stantly purchasing at the same retail rate.'12 A third approach
includes special rates for back-up and supplementary power service
to cover the power the QF normally produces itself. New York,
for example, placed special qualifications on when back-up power
could be obtained, and added transmission, penalty, and fixed cost

charges into back-up rate calculations. 83 New York also set rates
for supplementary power that included transmission and distribution costs. 84 In contrast, New Jersey adopted an approach more
favorable to QFs by eliminating additional charges if maintenance
was scheduled at the utility's convenience.' 85
Some controversy exists as to whether third party-financed
cogeneration facilities qualify as QFs in order to receive back-up
power from utilities. Recently, 86the FERC sustained back-up service
guarantees for such facilities.

182. See Wooster, supra note 3, at 753-54 (California and Idaho Commissions express this view).
183. 48 PUR4th at 754-55. See Re Consolidated Edison Co. 48 PUR4th 94,
114-20 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1982).
184. Id. at 123.
185. Wooster, supra note 3, at 755.
186. In Alcon (Puerto Rico) Inc., 32 F.E.R.C. (P) 61,247 (1985), order on
reh'g, 38 F.E.R.C. (P) 61,042 (1987), the FERC addressed the question of
whether PURPA's back-up power guarantees applied to a manufacturing plant
that leased the cogeneration equipment used in its plant and had no actual
ownership interest in the equipment. Alcon owned a pharmaceutical plant in
Puerto Rico and purchased electricity from the Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority (PREPA). Since steam was also used in the manufacturing plant, Alcon
decided that an industrial cogeneration system would reduce its energy costs.
Alcon entered into an agreement with O'Brien Energy Products whereby O'Brien
would engineer, procure, install, and operate a cogeneration system on Alcon's
property.
The lease agreement allowed Alcon, after five years, to extend the lease,
purchase the equipment, or have O'Brien remove the facility. The agreement was
structured as a lease because of tax and financial considerations. When Alcon
filed for certification as a QF under the FERC regulations, the PREPA argued
Alcon should be denied certification because O'Brien was the actual owner and
operator of the cogenerator. Furthermore, if O'Brien were the owner and therefore
entitled to back-up power from the PREPA, any resale of the back-up power to
Alcon would violate the ownership requirement.
The FERC allowed Alcon's certification, but denied its rights to back-up
power. 32 F.E.R.C. (P) 61,247, at 61,579. The Commission reasoned that Alcon
could not be an owner of the facility, and therefore, it was not entitled to backup power. Id. Language in the FERC regulations distinguishes energy- producing
facilities and energy-consuming facilities. Cogeneration facilities were defined as
energy-producing facilities. Since Alcon merely consumed energy, while O'Brien
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4. Interconnection and Wheeling

Interconnection is crucial to cogenerators because it relates

18 7
directly to the QFs' ability to purchase and sell electric power.

States have taken a variety of approaches in assessing interconnection costs. Some states, including Michigan, adopt the FERC
188
rule, flatly stating that QFs must pay the interconnection costs.
owned the production mechanisms, Alcon could not be a QF entitled to backup power. Id. at 61,577-78.
Commissioner Stalon's dissent criticized the majority's narrow view of qualifying facilities. He argued that the consuming/producing distinction was not
supported in the legislative history and that all the facts pointed to this arrangement as a typical unified cogeneration facility. Id. at 61,581-83. Stalon also
warned of the consequences if third party-financed cogenerators could not obtain
back-up power, noting that without back-up power, these facilities would not be
built, thereby frustrating PURPA's intent to encourage cogeneration. Id. at
61,581-84.
Commentators echoed Stalon's dissent and criticized the Commission's decision because it placed a substantial obstacle in the path of industrial cogenerators. See Greenberg, The ALCON Decision: Disincentive to Cogeneration, 7
ENERGY L.J. 101, 107-09 (1986); Nowak, FERC's Alcon Decision May Hinder
Cogeneration, 8 LEGA.L Tims, Sept. 30, 1985, at 10, 12-13.
In a 1987 rehearing, the FERC adopted Commissioner Stalon's dissent,
reversed its earlier decision, and ruled that Alcon was entitled to back-up power.
38 F.E.R.C. (P) 61,042 (1987). Although conceding that PURPA and the regulation could be read to exclude Alcon from the definition of an owner, the
Commission decided that the consequences of such an interpretation would be
too harsh. Id. at 61,119. The Commission found other language in the regulations
supporting the argument that consuming facilities are entitled to back-up power
and held that the right to back-up power extended to both producing and
consuming facilities, irrespective of whether both facilities have the same owner.
The FERC also noted the prior decision's detrimental effect on third party
financing arrangements. Id. at 61,120.
187. In this regard the FERC noted:
The availability and cost of interconnections are vital economic considerations for a QF. Interconnection requirements and associated fees can
discourage or over-encourage QFs as well as impose costs on a utility's
ratepayers and stockholders. If a QF cannot achieve interconnection
with the local utility, or can only do so at excessive expense, its incentive
to produce power will be greatly diminished. Alternatively, if a utility
is not fully compensated for all costs of interconnection, or if the
technical quality of the interconnection is insufficient, ratepayers or
stockholders will incur costs that they would not have incurred had the
utility generated its own power or purchased power from another wholesale source. Both situations result in inefficiencies and are at odds with
the objectives of PURPA.
Avoided Cost NOPR, supra note 169, at 85-86. See also Lock & Van Kuiken,
supra note 10, at 682; Wooster, supra note 3, at 756.
188. Re Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 48 PUR4th 465, 473
(Mich. P.S.C. 1982).
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Others have adopted more detailed procedures. New York specifically requires QFs to pay the cost of delivering power to utilities.
This cost includes a metering charge, a carrying charge covering
taxes, operation, maintenance, and first time costs, and the cost
of feasibility studies.'89 Massachusetts requires utilities to make
initial inspections of QF sites and to provide QFs with estimated
interconnection costs. 190
Most states allow the purchasing utility to determine the safety
and reliability aspects of interconnection. 9' Alaska, however, has
found that allowing utilities to set individual safety standards might
be detrimental to QFs and ordered the promulgation of uniform
rules. 192
Many state commissions have permitted financing schemes for
the payment of interconnection costs, with amortization periods
ranging from one to five years. 93 For example, Florida has required
the posting of surety bonds if the QF is making installment
194
payments to the utility.
In 1984, the FERC asserted exclusive and preemptive jurisdiction over rates for interstate wheeling of electric power. 95 Recently,

189. Re Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 48 PUR4th 94, 140-44
(N.Y.P.S.C. 1982).
190. Re Sales of Electricity by Small Power Producers and Cogenerators,
77 PUR4th 479, 486 (Mass. D.P.U. 1986).
191. Wooster, supra note 3, at 755. New York has adopted this procedure.
See 48 PUR4th at 144.
192. Re Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 57 PUR4th 731 (abstract
citing Alaska Pub. Util. Comm'n Order No. 4 (June 23, 1982)).
193. Lock & Van Kuiken, supra note 10, at 683.
194. Re Load Forecasts, Generation Expansion Plans, and Cogeneration
Prices for Peninsular Florida's Electric Utilities, 89 PUR4th 408, 409-10 (Fla.
P.S.C. 1988). The Florida Public Service Commission gave several reasons for
requiring surety bonds. First, a security interest agreement would give secured
creditor status to the utility and enhance its chance of reimbursement in case of
default. Second, flexibility to address various risks was assured since no specific
type of surety was required. Finally, this small obligation would not detrimentally
affect cogeneration. Id.
195. Florida Power & Light Co. and Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 29
F.E.R.C. (P) 61,140 at 61,291-92 (1984). The FERC found such authority under
part II of the Federal Power Act (FPA). Under section 201(b) of the FPA, (16
U.S.C. § 824(b)), the FERC has the ability to regulate transmission of energy in
interstate commerce. Under sections 205 and 206 (16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e), the
Commission must determine the reasonableness and justness of utility transmission
rates. Id. at 61,291. The FERC noted that these provisions of the FPA had
consistently been read to provide the FERC jurisdiction when the system is
interconnected within the state but has out of state connections. Id. at 61,291-

1084

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1051

the FERC extended its authority and largely preempted the entire
field of wheeling, including the regulation of the rates, terms, and
conditions of such transmission. 196 This decision has been criticized
as potentially hindering cogenerators' ability to obtain necessary
197
wheeling.

States have adopted several different approaches to wheeling.
Some states require it, while others allow it on a voluntary basis.
Massachusetts amended its regulations to require utilities to wheel
QF-produced power. 9 8 The QF must pay the cost of upgrading a
utility's transmission facilities if the upgrading is necessary to

provide the wheeling services.

99

Similarly, Florida requires utilities

to wheel electric power produced by QFs to other utilities upon
request. 200 Florida also requires the QFs to pay any costs incurred
by the utility in wheeling. 20' Connecticut statutorily requires electric
92 (citing Florida Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453
(1972); Florida Power Comm'n v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205
(1964)). Because all the Florida utilities involved were integrated within an
interstate power grid, the FERC had exclusive jurisdiction to set transmission
rates for cogenerated power. Id. at 61,288, 61,291-92.
196. Florida Power & Light Co., 40 F.E.R.C. (P) 61,045, at 61,116 (1987).
Although the FERC had previously declared its authority over interstate transmission rates, see supra note 195, the Florida Public Service Commission issued
new rules three years later asserting state jurisdiction over the terms and conditions
of interstate wheeling. Id. at (P) 61,116. The Florida Power & Light Company
challenged the new state rule, alleging that the FERC had exclusive jurisdiction
over the terms and conditions of interstate wheeling in addition to its exclusive
ratesetting authority.
The FERC agreed with Florida Power & Light, holding that it had exclusive
and preemptive jurisdiction over interstate wheeling. Id. at 61,120-21. The FERC
gave two reasons to support this ruling. First, sections 205(a) and 205(c) of the
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a), (c), had consistently been interpreted
as upholding the FERC's jurisdiction over the terms and conditions of interstate
wheeling. Id. at 61,120 (citing Kentucky Utilities Co. v. FERC, 789 F.2d 1210,
1211 (6th Cir. 1986); City of Cleveland, Ohio v. FERC, 773 F.2d 1368, 1370
(D.C. Cir. 1985)). Second, the Commission's implementing regulations, 18 C.F.R.
§ 35.2(b), also evidenced the FERC's regulatory jurisdiction over all classifications
and practices that affect rates in any manner. 40 F.E.R.C. at 61,120.
197. See Radford, Transmission Access for Cogenerators - Why Make it
a Federal Question?, 120 Pun. Urn. FORT., Sept. 17, 1987, at 4.
198. Re Sales of Electricity by Small Power Producers and Cogenerators,
77 PUR4th 479, 490 (Mass. D.P.U. 1986).
199. Id.
200. Re Wheeling of Cogenerated Energy, 70 PUR4th 143, 148-49 (Fla.
P.S.C. 1985).
201. Id. at 149. Florida also allows utilities to deny or curtail transmission
services if such service "would adversely affect the adequacy, reliability, or cost
of electric service" to the utilities' other customers. Id.
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to other
utilities to transmit energy from private power producers 202
utilities or other facilities owned by the private producer.
Wisconsin adopted a voluntary approach to wheeling after its
public service commission concluded that the FERC did not want
wheeling forced upon utilities. 20 3 North Carolina and the District
of Columbia also adopted voluntary wheeling programs in deference to the FERC's authority to set rates for the interstate transmission of energy.2 4
5. Data Filing
The requirements for data filing, like the interconnection and
wheeling approaches, vary among the states.205 Michigan, for example, insists that utilities provide QFs with data concerning the
present and anticipated future avoided cost on the utilities system. 206 Michigan utilities must also file, at least every two years,
data with the public service commission that includes: present
avoided cost calculations, estimates of avoided cost for the next
capacity requirements and additions for
five years, and planned
20 7
the next ten years.
State implementation of PURPA has fostered decentralized
power production by creating a large new power generating industry. Although largely successful, cogeneration has caused utilities, cogenerators, and regulators many problems that require
solutions to satisfy the goals of PURPA.

202. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-243a(b)(4) (West 1988).
203. Re Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 54 PUR4th 380, 401
(Wis. P.S.C. 1983). The utility must notify the state commission if it does not
wish to wheel power. Id.
204. Re Rates for Sale and Purchase of Electricity Between Electric Utilities
and Qualifying Facilities, 64 PUR4th 369, 391-92 (N.C.U.C. 1985); Re Potomac
Electric Power Co., Formal Case No. 757, Order No. 7638 (Aug. 3, 1982), 3
D.C.P.S.C. 359.
205. It has been suggested that national data reporting requirements should
be used to clarify certain issues, including: proposed QF sites, the growth potential
of new QFs, and the maintainance of operating and efficiency standards. See
FERC Examines Cogeneration with Changes in PURPA Regulation Possible, 119
PuB. UTI. FORT., May 14, 1987, at 24. The Edison Electric Institute stated that
"[w]ithout this information utilities and state and federal governments will be
unable to track the magnitude of QF-produced capacity ....

."

Id. at 25.

206. Re Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 48 PUR4th 465, 47576 (Mich. P.S.C. 1982).
207. Id.
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Proposed Changes to FERC Regulations

In response to the problems arising from both PURPA's
implementation and the huge growth of the cogeneration industry,20 the FERC recently issued three Notices of Proposed Rule-

makings (NOPRs) dealing with changes to the present cogeneration

regulations. 209 The subject of considerable debate and controversy,
these NOPRs signal important changes for all cogenerators with
respect to the administrative determination of avoided cost, competitive0 bidding schemes, and the role of independent power prod21
ucers .

208. The chairman of the FERC noted this growth:
PURPA has evolved into something beyond everyone's expectations,
and has fostered a multi-billion dollar industry providing a majority of
the new generating capacity in several regions of the country. The
Commission's rules, and the state's implementation of them, did not
generally anticipate the large role PURPA has come to play.
FERC Chairman Martha 0. Hesse, Remarks Before Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, News Release 317256 (July 9, 1987) (on file at The
Wayne Law Review).
In terms of electric production, the amount of electric power produced by
QFs was more than five times the projected amount from 1980-1985. See Avoided
Cost NOPR, supra note 169, at 17 n.42.
209. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulations Governing Independent
Power Producers, 53 Fed. Reg. 9327 (FERC proposed Mar. 16, 1988) [hereinafter
IPP NOPR]; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulations Governing Bidding
Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 9324 (FERC proposed Mar. 16, 1988) [hereinafter Bidding
NOPRI; Avoided Cost NOPR, supra note 169.
The FERC gave the following reasons for amending the cogeneration regulations: (1) PURPA implementation currently causes excessive electricity costs for
utilities and their customers; (2) the current regulations place too much risk
without sufficient reward to efficient power suppliers that provide reliable and
less costly electricity; (3) the existing regulatory system fails to provide enough
incentive to make efficient decisions for the future; and (4) increased use of
market forces would help to meet the difficulties of a decentralized power supply
system. FERC NoTIcEs OF PROPOSED

RULEMAKING ON ELECTRICITY

6 (Mar. 29,

1988) (on file at The Wayne Law Review).
210. The NOPRs issued March 16, 1988 contained several changes from
earlier drafts due to strong opposition from state utility commissioners. One of
the most hotly debated issues was a draft of the Bidding NOPR that dealt with
the regulation of multistate utilities. An earlier draft would have required state
commissions to jointly conduct bidding programs for multistate utilities on a
regional basis, or, in the alternative, the utilities could conduct their own
competitive bidding program subject to federal jurisdiction and review by the
FERC. Additionally, earlier drafts of the Avoided Cost NOPR would have given
the FERC review powers over rates set by multistate utilities when states could
not agree on a single regional basis. This provoked great fears that the FERC
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The NOPR dealing with administrative determination of avoided
cost reaffirms the avoided cost standard as the best method for

determining purchase rates for QFs, but adds new requirements

and makes suggestions to better implement the standard. 21 1 In
determining avoided cost, the proposed regulations require consid-

eration of a utility's capacity and note that a utility need not make
capacity payments when capacity is not needed. 2 2 In order to
was trying to preempt the field of multistate utility regulation. See Romo,
Observers PredictElectric ProposalsWill "Fundamentally Change" Industry, 121
PuB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 14, 1988, at 40 [hereinafter, Observers]; Romo, Four
Days in March: When NARUC Took on the FERC, 121 PuB. UTI. FORT., Mar.
31, 1988, at 25-28.
The final NOPRs dropped some of the multistate utility regulatory text, and
solicited additional comments on the issues of single regional avoided cost rates
and single regional competitive bidding schemes. However, many commentators
remained concerned with the enduring preemptive aspects. See Opinion of F.E.R.C.
Comm'r C. Trabandt, Bidding NOPR, supra note 209, at 11-12, 47-48 [hereinafter
Trabandt opinion]; Romo, Observers, supra, at 41.
Another important issue not addressed by the three NOPRs is transmission
access, which is currently a matter of bitter debate between utilities and cogenerators. Utilities and their advocates like the Edison Electric Institute raise
concerns of consumer protection, system reliability, scheduling difficulties, and
resource planning problems if cogenerators are allowed greater access. Romo,
FERC Examines Cogeneration with Changes in PURPA Regulations Possible,
119 PuB. UTn. FORT., May 14, 1987, at 24-25. Cogeneration supporters like the
Cogeneration Coalition of America respond that cogenerators need more access
to help secure true market-based rates. Id. at 25-26. See also Haman-Guild &
Pfeffer, Competitive Bidding for New Electric Power Supplies: Deregulation or
Reregulation, 120 PB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 17, 1987, at 9, 18-19.
In its 1986 regional conferences, the FERC solicited comments on the
transmission access issue. While acknowledging that this was the "most controversial" issue of the conferences, a FERC staff proposal noted that "most parties
seemed to agree that transmission questions needed to be evaluated in a broader
context than PURPA reform." FERC, SuMMARY OF CURRrr STAFF PROPOSALS
ON PURPA-RELATED IssuEs 2 (Sept. 11, 1987) (on file at The Wayne Law
Review). FERC Chairman Martha Hesse has indicated that the FERC intends to
proceed with a reexamination of the present regulation of transmission service.
Any changes would be with regard to both transmission pricing and transmission
access. Martha 0. Hesse, Remarks at the Southeastern Electric Exchange (Mar.
28, 1988) (on file at The Wayne Law Review).
211. Avoided Cost NOPR, supra note 169, at 28-35.
212. Id. at 46-48 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.304(e)(3)(g)). Consideration of a utility's need for capacity in determining capacity credits was a
major concern of the electric utilities. Several major utilities reported substantial
overpayment in capacity costs when no capacity was needed. For example,
Houston Lighting and Power Company estimates it will make $500 million in
overpayments by 1995. Id. at 11 n.24. Niagara Mohawk Power Company has
estimated overpayments reaching $180 million by the year 2000. Id. Finally,
Pacific Gas & Electric Company estimates "it will incur $857 million in overpayments per year by 1990." Id. (emphasis in original).
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assure that avoided cost determinations comply with PURPA's
goals, the NOPR requires consideration of several factors in determining avoided cost. These factors include the availability of
purchases from wholesale sources, the effect of the QF's fuel
source on the utility's reliability,
and the variability of avoided
213
cost rates during the year.
The FERC amended its regulation of fixed price contracts to
allow greater pricing flexibility. Purchase rates under fixed contracts may differ from avoided cost at the time of delivery.
However, purchase rates cannot exceed the total avoided costs "as
calculated at the time the obligation is incurred.' '214 Front-endloaded contracts remain permissible if several factors, including
the time value of money, the QF's financial
needs, and other
215
equitable considerations are addressed.
The FERC also clarified its regulations pertaining to supplemental, back-up, maintenance, and interruptible power. The Commission clearly stated that interruptible power is adjunct to other
services and that utilities are obligated to provide QFs with backup, supplemental, and maintenance power on both a firm and
interruptible basis. 21 6 The FERC explicitly interpreted the phrase
"upon request ' 21 7 (regarding when a utility must provide such
services to QFs) "to impose an 'absolute obligation' on the utility
to provide service ....",218 The FERC also proposed language
clarifying a utility's obligation to supply back-up and maintenance
power to both the power producing equipment of a QF and any
electric loads normally served by that QF.21 9 Finally, the FERC
213. Id. at 45-54 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.304(e)(3-5)).
214. Id. at 66 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(5)).
215. Id. at 64-67. The FERC allowed such front end loaded contracts, but
also noted these contracts were discouraged because of major problems with
inequities to ratepayers and economic inefficiency. Id. at 56-59.
216. Id. at 75-76 (citing Oglethorpe, supra note 147, at 61,135) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. § 292.305(b)(1)).
"Supplementary power" is "electric energy or capacity supplied by an electric
utility, regularly used by a qualifying facility in addition to that which the facility
generates itself." 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(8) (1988).
"Interruptible power" is "electric energy or capacity supplied by an electric
utility subject to interruption by the electric utility under specified conditions."

Id. § 292.101(b)(10).
"Maintenance power" is "electric energy or capacity supplied by an electric
utility during scheduled outages of the QF." Id. § 292.101(b)(11).
217. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.305(b) (1988).
218. Avoided Cost NOPR, supra note 169, at 76.
219. Id. at 78-79 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 292.305(b)(2)). This explicitly
resolves the problem raised in the Alcon case, supra note 186.

19891

COGENERA TION

1089

requested comments on whether certain factors should
be consid220
ered in determining back-up and maintenance power.
The Avoided Cost NOPR amends the interconnection regulation to permit QFs to own or construct interconnection and
transmission facilities under certain conditions. 22' These conditions
include compliance with all state regulations and require that the
interconnection or transmission facility222 be used for sales and
purchases between the QF and utilities.

A second NOPR considers competitive bidding schemes.
Under the proposed regulations, states could establish voluntary
bidding programs as an alternative to administrative determinations
of avoided cost. 224 State regulators and non-regulated utilities would
have the discretion to establish these systems, and the QFs would

220. Avoided Cost NOPR, supra note 169, at 82-84. For back-up power
these factors include: the expected timing, frequency, and duration of scheduled
outages; the expected demand placed on the utility by such outages; and the
utility's costs associated with meeting the outages. For maintenance power, the
factors include: the ability of the QF to schedule its outages; the duration of the
outages; the expected demand placed on the utility by the scheduled outage; and
the costs to the utility of providing maintenance power. Id. at 83-84.
221. Id. at 92-93 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 292.306(c)). The FERC felt
that allowing QFs to construct and own such facilities would minimize the costs
and improve the efficiency of the interconnection systems. Id. at 87-88. Under
the current regulations, utilities have little incentive to lower costs, and could
actually take measures to discourage interconnection with QFs. Id. at 88. Since
the QFs had the incentive to increase profits by insuring reliable, efficient systems,
the FERC thought it wise to allow QF ownership of interconnection and transmission facilities. Id. at 89. This decision was foreseeable; in two prior decisions,
the FERC had found interconnection facilities to be within the definition of
"qualifying facility." See Clarion Power Co., 39 F.E.R.C. (P) 61,317, at 62,014
(1987); Kern River Cogeneration Co., 31 F.E.R.C. (P) 61,183, at 61,355 (1985).
222. Avoided Cost NOPR, supra note 169, at 92-93.
223. Bidding NOPR, supra note 209 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.201.211).
224. The FERC listed several problems with current avoided cost determinations that could be solved by implementing a bidding program. First, "administrative determination regarding utilities' avoided costs has often been cumbersome,
slow, and inconsistent." Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). Second, avoided cost
calculations have sometimes been inaccurate because of a failure to consider the
availability of all of a utility's possible alternative purchase opportunities. Id. at
10. Third, selling power to utilities on a first-come, first-serve basis is less efficient
than competitive bidding schemes. Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
If bidding systems are adopted, "[a]voided cost need not be an administratively determined number, argued over by experts. Instead, avoided cost could
be derived simply and directly from the prices offered from competing suppliers
in the bidding process." Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).
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have an option to participate.? Utilities would still be required to
buy power from losing and non-participating QFs, but payment
would be based only on avoided energy costs. 226
The FERC listed several conditions that must be satisfied if a
competitive bidding program is adopted. First, states can reserve
capacity for certain technologies or fuels, as long as QFs are
allowed to participate. 227 However, no capacity may be exempted
from QF participation. 22 Second, the bidding process must con-

225. Id. at 12. The FERC stressed that beyond following the conditions
provided, implementation of bidding schemes would be up to the states. This
leaves room for states to experiment with various programs. Id. at 17.
Several states have already adopted competitive bidding schemes as a means
of efficiently allocating capacity credits and awarding contracts. Texas, Maine,
Massachusetts, and California have implemented such bidding programs; Connecticut, Illinois, and New York are working on similar proposals. See HamanGuild & Pfeffer, supra note 210, at 11-12; Meade, Competitive Bidding and the
Regulatory Balancing Act, 120 PuB. UTm. FORT., Sept. 17, 1987, at 22, 24-27.
The Michigan Public Service Commission recently considered whether to
adopt competitive bidding as a method for determining avoided cost. In In re
Midland Cogeneration Venture Limited Partnership,Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Case No. U-8871, (Jan. 31, 1989), the Commission tentatively rejected competitive
bidding, reasoning that setting up the system would be too time-consuming at
the present. Id. at 47. However, the Commission went on to direct the utility
involved, Consumers Power, to submit within six months a proposal including a
competitive bidding system that eliminates any problems of self-dealing. Id. at
110. Therefore, it appears Michigan is close to adopting some type of bidding
system.
The preemptive aspects of this NOPR caused much concern. Most state
utility commissioners expressed the need for flexibility in setting up bidding
programs, yet earlier drafts of the NOPR would have seriously eroded that
flexibility. In fact, Commissioner Trabandt's partial dissent to the NOPR states
that an earlier proposal "would have had the effect of rendering almost all, if
not all, existing state competitive programs illegal and preempted. .. ." Trabandt
Opinion, Bidding NOPR, supra note 209, at 49. Trabandt noted that the current
NOPR had undergone serious revision and would require only minor adjustments
in existing state programs. Id.
226. Bidding NOPR, supra note 209, at 26. The FERC tentatively concluded
that since QFs are preferred in the bidding process, the QF's bid must be selected
in the case of a tie between the bids of a QF and a non-QF. Id. at 26-27. The
Commission also stated that winning bidders could waive the efficiency standard
for oil- and gas-fired cogeneration facilities. Id. at 34-36.
227. Id. at 36 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 292.302) (footnote omitted).
228. Id. at 36-37. "A practice of reserving capacity needs to be met only
by a particular supplier would appear to be systematically discriminatory against
QFs," thereby violating the statutory obligation to encourage purchase of QF
power. Id. at 37.
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sider all potential supply sources. 229 Third, consideration of nonprice factors affecting the security and operation of the purchasing
utility's system, including fuel diversity and the QF's reliability,
must be explained in writing during solicitation. 2 0 Fourth, in order
that all participants receive equal treatment, the FERC required
that full and complete information be available to all parties.2'
This includes publicizing such facts as "the quantity and characteristics of capacity needed, the terms of the offer to purchase
capacity, the criteria for participation and the criteria for bid
selection .... ,,2 Fifth, states and nonregulated utilities must
certify bids to the FERC.233 Finally, although only under consideration as a sixth condition, restrictions
on negotiating after final
234
bids are submitted may be required.
The third NOPR addressed regulations governing independent
power producers (IPPs), a class of non-QF power suppliers. 235 The
proposed regulations would streamline rate and nonrate regulation
of the IPPs in order to realize their benefits to the electric industry
23 6
and ratepayers.

229. Id. at 39 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 292.203). The FERC believed
this requirement was necessary, for without it, "there is no assurance that a QF
will receive a price that is less than or equal to the purchasing utility's real
avoided cost." Id. at 40. The Commission noted that direct bidding by all
potential sources was the most direct and efficient means of fulfilling this
requirement. Id. at 40-41.
230. Id. at 47-49. These factors are listed in 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (1988).
231. Bidding NOPR, supra note 209, at 50-51 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R.
§ 292.204(b)).
232. Id. at 50.
233. Id. at 53 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 293.211). The FERC reasoned
that certification would: (1) ensure state participation in the bidding schemes; (2)
minimize controversy over the accuracy of purchase rates; and (3) provide
administrative advantages to the FERC. Id. at 53-54.
234. Id. at 45-47.
235. IPP NOPR, supra note 209. IPPs are defined as "wholesale producers
(other than qualifying facilities under PURPA) that are unaffiliated with franchised utilities in the area in which the IPPs are selling power and that lack
significant market power." Id. at 3-4 (footnote omitted). Public utilities may
also qualify as IPPs if certain requirements are met. Id. at 4 n.4 (to be codified
at 18 C.F.R. § 38.103(a)).
236. The FERC recognized several potential benefits of more flexible IPP
regulation: (1) IPPs would serve as another source of electric capacity; (2) greater
incentives for lower cost IPP power would lower electricity costs; (3) innovative
technologies would be fostered; (4) IPPs would assume risks currently borne by
ratepayers and utility investors; (5) the number of the PURPA machines would
be mitigated; and (6) other indirect benefits. Id. at 48-64.
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The FERC felt that IPPs "should be freed from traditional
embedded cost-of-service regulation" and should be granted greater
pricing flexibility under the Federal Power Act (FPA).2 7 Thus, the
IPPs' sales rates would be deemed just and reasonable under the
FPA if they do not exceed the purchasing utility's avoided cost. 238
This avoided cost cap can be determined in a number of ways,
including the use of administrative proceedings conducted by the
state, through a bidding program, or the purchasing utility can
estimate the cap.23 9 The FERC rules would allow the IPPs extensive
downward pricing flexibility by setting
a ceiling on avoided cost
24
rate without setting a floor price.

0

Other proposals would exempt IPPs from cost-related accounting and recordkeeping requirements.24 ' IPPs would also be allowed
greater flexibility with respect to the disposition of facilities, issuance of securities, and interlocking directorate activities. 242 Filing
243
fees would be revised, and any annual charges would be waived.
Finally, an advance certification procedure for IPP qualifying
244
status will be adopted.

These NOPRs reaffirm the vitality of PURPA and its extensive
regulatory scheme. They provide a clear signal to prospective
operators of cogeneration's bright future and of the continuing
importance of PURPA.

IV.

FUEL USE ACT

The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 245 (FUA)
is the second piece of legislation important to potential cogenerators. Depending on fuel use, the FUA may pose problems for
some cogenerators, although in practice the FUA is a small obstacle
for most cogeneration facilities.
The FUA was enacted as part of the National Energy Act to
establish a program for the expanded use "of coal and other
alternate fuels as primary energy sources for existing and new

237. Id. at 95.
238. Id. at 95-98 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 38.1030), .201(b)).
239. Id. at 101 (footnote omitted) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 38.201(c)).
240. Id. at 102-04 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 38.201(b)).
241. Id. at 112 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 38.701).
242. Id. at 106-12 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 38.301-.506).
243. Id. at 115-16.
244. Id. at 116-18 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 38.601-.603).
245. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (1982), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8301-8484
(West 1983 & Supp. 1989) and scattered titles of the U.S.C.
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electric powerplants and major fuel-burning installations ....

Its main purposes included: (1) reducing the importation of oil
and increasing the country's capability to use indigenous energy

resources; (2) conservation of oil and natural gas; and (3) encourof coal and other alternate fuels as important
aging greater use
247
energy sources.

To achieve these goals, the FUA prohibited the use of natural
gas or petroleum as primary energy sources in newly constructed
electric powerplants, and required these plants to burn coal or
some alternate fuel. 248 Additionally, existing powerplants were required to convert to coal or some alternate fuel by 1990.249 This
conversion requirement was repealed in 1981 as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.250
Amendments to the FUA251 repealed its prohibition on the use
of natural gas and petroleum as primary fuels for electric powerplants.2 2 The changes were made because the FUA's impact on
fuel choices by new and existing facilities was found to be "far

246. 42 U.S.C. § 8301(a)(1) (1982).
247. Id.§ 8301(b).
248. Id.§§ 8311-12.
249. Id.§ 8341.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 8341 (1982). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
substituted a voluntary compliance procedure for the conversion requirement.
This enabled complying powerplants to receive preferential treatment under the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). Existing powerplants switching
to coal are exempted from the Clean Air Act's strict new source performance
standards. These plants need only satisfy the standards contained in the state
implementation plan. See infra notes 265-83 and accompanying text.
251. See Act of May 21, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-42, (to be codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
252. The House Committee Report listed five reasons for amending the
FUA. First, the committee felt that changing market conditions made the use of
natural gas and oil more attractive, and that these fuels are reliable and costeffective energy sources for the future. Second, the committee reasoned that the
restrictions that had been placed on the fuel choices of utilities and industries
were not justified in the absence of high prices and volume shortages. Instead,
the committee favored a diversified approach, with the individual consumer
allowed to make his own choices as to fuel use. Third, the decontrol of oil and
gas prices removed the "artificially attractive 'below market' prices" for these
fuels, in relation to other fuels, which might have led to overconsumption.
Fourth, the committee felt it unwise to prohibit the use of oil and gas in light
of the financial distress faced by domestic oil and gas producers. Finally, the
self-certification procedures included in the amendment would result in lower
administrative costs for obtaining exemptions. H.R. REP. No. 78, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADhMnN. Nnws 270, 274-76.

1094

[Vol. 35:1051

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

less significant than was originally expected.

' 25 3

Presently, new

electric powerplants need only have the "design capability to be
converted to coal or another alternate fuel as market conditions
,,254
warrant in the future ....
The potential conflict between the FUA and cogeneration was
readily apparent. 2 5 Under the FUA, if the Secretary of Energy
finds that the QF has demonstrated that it cannot obtain the
economic and other benefits of cogeneration unless petroleum or
natural gas, or both, are used, the facility may be granted an
exemption from compliance.2 6 Both new and existing cogeneration
253. Id. at 273. With regard to existing facilities, the House Committee
found that the FUA "had no direct impact" on fuel choices. Instead, the
reductions in oil and gas consumption were attributed to the phasing out of price
controls. Id. The FUA's impact on the construction of new electric powerplants
was also viewed as minimal, with more weight given to the broader terms of
conservation, the sluggish growth of the economy, and the utilities' efforts at
reducing dependence on oil and gas supplies. Id. at 273-74.
254. 42 U.S.C. § 8311(b) (West Supp. 1989) provides:
An electric powerplant has the capability to use coal or another
alternate fuel for purposes of this section if such electric powerplant(1) has sufficient inherent design characteristics to permit the addition of equipment (including all necessary pollution devices) necessary
to render such electric powerplant capable of using coal or another
alternate fuel as its primary energy source; and
(2) is not physically, structurally, or technologically precluded from
using coal or another alternate fuel as its primary energy source.
Capability to use coal or another alternate fuel shall not be interpreted to require any such powerplant to be immediately able to use
coal or another alternate fuel as its primary energy source on its initial
day of operation.
Id.
The Committee recognized the possibility of unforeseeable changes in the
availability and price of oil and gas, and accordingly included the coal capability
requirement. Since the United States has an abundant supply of coal, this
requirement mitigates any undue reliance on oil or gas supplies. 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmIN. NEWS, supra note 252, at 276-77.
255. See Polsky, supra note 85, at 20.
256. 42 U.S.C. § 8322(c) (1982) applies to new facilities, and § 8352(c)
applies to existing facilities. Both provide:
After consideration of a petition (and comments thereon) for an exemption from one or more of the prohibitions of [the FUA], the
Secretary may, by order, grant a permanent exemption under this
subsection with respect to natural gas or petroleum, if he
(1) finds that the petitioner has demonstrated that economic and
other benefits of cogeneration are unobtainable unless petroleum or
natural gas, or both, are used in such facility, and
(2) includes in the final order a statement of the basis for such
finding.
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facilities may be given permanent exemptions from compliance
with the fuel use standards.
There are two ways for a QF to prove that the benefits of
cogeneration are unobtainable unless oil or gas is used. Under the
first method, it must certify that (1) "the oil and gas to be
consumed by the cogeneration facility will be less than that which
would otherwise be consumed in the absence of the cogeneration,"
and (2) the use of fuel mixtures is not possible .2 7 Therefore,
greater oil and gas savings exist if the cogeneration plant burned
less oil and gas than if the electricity and thermal energy were
produced separately.258 QFs must follow specific requirements to
prove such savings, including providing
certifications, exhibits, and
25 9
environmental impact statements.
Under the second method, the QF must demonstrate that (1)
"it would be in the public interest to grant an exemption to the
cogeneration facility because of special circumstances such as technical innovation, maintaining industry in urban areas, or other
reasons which convince [the Department of Energy] that granting
the exemption would be in the public interest"; and (2) the use
of fuel mixtures is not feasible. 260 To show that the exemption
would further the public interest, the QF must provide both an
explanation of the public interest26 factors to be considered and an
environmental impact statement. '
The amendments did not affect the exemption procedures. The
exemption process has been employed extensively, and exemptions
from the oil and gas restrictions for new facilities have been
liberally granted. The Department of Energy (DOE) has validated
262 and "[iun fact, DOE has never denied
most claims within a year,
' 261
a completed petition.
This analysis indicates that the FUA will not be an obstacle
for cogenerators that comply with the administrative procedures.

257. 10 C.F.R. § 503.37(a)(1) (1988).
258. Id. § 503.37(b). The FERC provided a table of the estimated number
of Btus of oil or gas that might be saved per kilowatt hour of electricity displaced
by cogenerated electricity. The estimated savings range from 100 Btu/kWh in
southern Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Indiana to 9900 Btu/
kWh in portions of Texas. Id. § 503.37(e).
259. Id. §§ 503.37(c)(1)(i)-(iii).
260. Id. §§ 503.37(a)(2)(i)-(ii).
261. Id. §§ 503.37(c)(2)(i)-(ii).
262. Id.
263. 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & AiDmI. NEWS, supra note 252, at 273-74.
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The prospective cogenerator need only follow the required steps

to insure an exemption from any fuel use restrictions.
V.

CLEAN AIR ACT

The final part of the regulatory structure affecting cogenerators
is the Clean Air Act (CAA). 264 The CAA can cause substantial
cost problems for the potential cogenerator, depending on the type
of fuel used and the resulting emissions.
The CAA and its amendments 265 created a complex and comprehensive regulatory scheme for controlling air pollution. It was
designed to "protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the
production capacity of its population. ' 266 The CAA empowers
both the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states
267
to enact comprehensive plans to achieve acceptable air quality.

To implement its goals, the CAA authorizes the EPA to
develop National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQSs) for
certain pollutants. 26 The NAAQSs "specify maximum pollutant
concentrations that are deemed by regulation to be safe for exposure over various time periods.''269 Ambient standards are generalized and do not pertain to individual source emissions. 270 The
EPA must issue primary and secondary air quality standards for

264. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
265. The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 amended the Air Quality Act of
1967, but the changes were so pervasive that they are referred to as the Clean
Air Act of 1970. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,
91 Stat. 685, made major additions to and deletions from the 1970 Act. The
entire statute was recodified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
For a history of the federal government's regulation of air pollution, see F.
ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW
AND POLICY 129-35 (1984) [hereinafter F. ANDERSON].
266. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1982).
267. See Davis, Kurtock, Leape & Magill, Clean Air Act of 1977: Away
from Technology-Forcing? 2 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1977).
268. The CAA regulates only those pollutants "which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare" and which are emitted "from
numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources." 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a)(1)(A)(B) (1982).
At present, there are six criteria pollutants: sulfur oxides, particulate matter,
carbon monoxide, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, and lead. For a discussion of these

pollutants and their detrimental effects, see F.

120-25.
269. F. ANDERSON, supra note 265, at 137.
270. Id.

ANDERSON,

supra note 265, at
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each of the criteria pollutants. 271 Primary standards are aimed at
protecting the public health with "an adequate margin of safety.' '272
Secondary standards "protect the public welfare from any known
or anticipated adverse effects" on other environmental
resources
273
such as water, vegetation, wildlife, and property.
To complement the NAAQSs, the CAA also authorizes the
EPA to set uniform national technology-limited emission requirements for particular sources of air pollution. Under this provision,
New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) were created to control
the emissions from new stationary sources. 274 Major new stationary
sources are required to use the "best system of continuous emission
reduction" to meet the performance standards. 275 These systems
are defined as precombustion cleaning and fuel treatments or other
processes that are "inherently low-polluting or nonpolluting." 276
Gas-fired cogenerators should have no difficulty meeting the CAA
requirements; however, waste- or coal-fired facilities could face
major capital costs for emission control equipment.
Under the CAA, state and local governments have the primary
responsibility for air pollution prevention and control. The Act
requires that the states formulate State Implementation Plans
(SIPs) to enforce and maintain the primary and secondary air
quality standards. 277 Once approved by the EPA, these SIPs have
the force of state and federal law and may be enforced by both
state and federal agencies. 278
The 1977 amendments set up different SIP requirements for
regions not yet meeting the NAAQSs (nonattainment areas), and
for regions with air quality exceeding the NAAQSs (attainment

271. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1)(A) (1982). The EPA's regulations setting the
primary and secondary standards for the criteria pollutants are located at 40
C.F.R. §§ 50.1-.12 (1987). It should be noted that carbon monoxide has only a
primary standard. The secondary standard was eliminated several years ago. See
Current Developments, 16 Env't Rep. 859 (BNA 1985).
272. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1982).
273. Id. §§ 7409(b)(2), 7602(h).
274. Id. § 7411. "New source" and "stationary source" are defined in §§
7411(a)(2), (3).
275. Id. § 7411(a)(1)(C).
276. Id. §§ 7411(a)(7)(A)-(B).
277. Id. § 7410(a)(1). For the general requirements pertaining to the mechanics of the SIPs, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.328 (1988). The regulations dealing
with the promulgation and approval of SIPs are contained in 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.01.2850 (1988).
278. 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1982).
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areas). 2 9 In nonattainment areas, major new sources must obtain
permits that limit their emissions. The permits also require the
source to use equipment that will achieve the lowest achievable
emissions rate (LAER). 2 0 The SIP requirements in attainment areas

are designed to prevent significant deterioration of the high air
quality,2 8' and new plants in these areas must use the best available
control technology (BACT). 282 States are given wide discretion in

implementing the LAER and BACT standards.
The CAA also regulates interstate air pollution. The Act requires states to implement SIPs that will prevent stationary sources
from emitting any pollutant that will either "prevent attainment
or maintenance by any other State of any such national primary
or secondary ambient air quality standard," or "interfere with
measures required to be included in the applicable implementation
plan for any other State ... to prevent ... deterioration of air
quality or to protect visibility .... 281

For prospective cogenerators, the existence and magnitude of
CAA problems will depend on the fuel source used. Systems using
coal or waste can expect to encounter the most problems with the
CAA requirements, because the emissions from such fuel sources
contain large amounts of the criteria pollutants. Thus, those systems will likely incur the higher capital costs involved in installing
mandatory cleaning systems. A cogenerator must work closely with
state officials to ensure that plant emissions meet the CAA requirements.
VI.

DETROIT

COGENERATION

PROJECT

The Detroit cogeneration project is the largest facility of its
kind in the world today. It is a product of PURPA, and subject
to the breadth of its regulatory structure. The project serves as a
prime example of the problems cogenerators face in entering the
field of electric power supply.

279. Id. § 7501(2).
280. Id. § 7501(3). "LAER was intended to be the strictest of the Clean Air
Act's technology-based standards, stricter than the 'best available control technology' (BACT) applicable in clean air areas, which in turn is stricter than the
NSPS." F. ANDERSON, supra note 265, at 245. See also infra note 330.
281. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470(1)-(5).
282. Id. § 7475(a)(4). For a definition of BACT, see infra note 321.
283. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(E).
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A.

Detroit's Central Steam Heating System
Detroit has had a central steam heating system since 1903,84
when the Detroit Edison Company was organized to build and
operate an electric power plant to supply energy to the electric
companies already serving the city. 285 By 1915, Detroit Edison had
become the sole provider of steam heat for the central city. 2 6 The
steam output of the central heating system expanded greatly under
28 7
Edison's control through the 1950s.
The system reached peak sales in 1972.28 However, economic
factors have since caused a decline in sales. The system lost
29
profitability due to rapidly increasing natural gas and oil prices.
To offset higher fuel costs, Detroit Edison raised the retail rate
for steam. As a result of the increased rates, new customers have
been reluctant to connect with the system, and some customers
29
disconnected service. 0
Alternative and less expensive methods of generating steam
would enable the central steam heating system to become a source
of potential economic development by stabilizing energy prices.
Because of its ability to produce and use steam while simultaneously addressing Detroit's major solid waste problem, cogeneration
became an attractive means of revitalizing Detroit's steam heating
system.
1. The Project
On September 14, 1981, Detroit announced plans for construc29
tion of the Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Facility (GDRRF). 1
284. R. MILLER, KILOWATTS AT WORK -

A HISTORY OF THE DETROIT EDISON

CoMiPANY 166-74 (1957).

285. Id. at 172.
286. Id. at 174. The actual number of customers for the steam heat declined
from 1920-1950, and the system was a break even business. "[lit was maintained
and even extended because of the profitable electrical load which was related to
it." Id.
287. By 1980, sales had fallen to 2.23 x 109kg, and the number of customers
had fallen to 764. McLain, Brinker & Gatton, Potential Benefits of a Resource
Recovery Facility Coupled with District Heating in Detroit, Michigan, ORNL/
TM-8463 (Sept. 1982).
288. By the late 1970s, natural gas provided 88 percent of the fuel for the
district steam heating system, fuel oil provided 7 percent, and coal 5 percent.
For 1981, the steam heating system showed a loss of $1.8 million, with fuel
supplies accounting for 82% of the system's operating costs. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. For example, the Renaissance Center, a major dowtown Detroit
office and hotel complex, elected to install its own heating system instead of
interconnecting with the central steam heating system.
291. Solid waste disposal is the primary function of the GDRRF. The city
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This bottoming-cycle cogeneration facility will serve the city by
providing both a solid waste disposal method and an alternate
source of steam for the district heating system. 292 The GDRRF will

process non-hazardous solid waste from residential and commercial
sources. Detroit Edison will purchase both the steam and the
electricity produced by the GDRRF. 293
The facility is "capable of processing up to 4000 tons of solid
waste per day.' '294 Residue that remains after processing, involving
approximately "8% by volume and 14% by weight of the original
refuse," will be landfilled.295
The power-generating facility includes three identical refuse-

derived, fuel-fired, spreader-stoker boilers, two of which will operate while the third serves as a back-up. Particulate emissions
from the operating boilers are controlled by a five-stage electrostatic precipitator, with the remaining exhaust released through the
stacks. The boiler fly ash and bottom ash from the travelling

grates are collected in a water tank, dried, and then stored in an
ash storage building. In addition to supplying the low pressure
steam demand of the city's central heating system, the boilers
provide high pressure steam to produce 70MW of electricity. 296
The heat output from the plant is dissipated through water cooling

condensers. The plant also has a state of the art odor control
strategy, including a first-in, first-out system, dry processing, odor297

ous materials removal, and daily maintenance.

collects approximately 3000 tons of solid refuse daily. This solid waste must be
compacted and transported to landfill sites outside the city. Detroit's solid waste
fills about 60 acres of landfill each year, and since its Wayne County landfills
have very short remaining lives, the city will soon be forced to haul its refuse to
more distant landfills. This will result in increased transportation costs. When
operable, the GDRRF will significantly reduce the volume of waste requiring
landfilling, thereby substantially easing the landfill space problem.
292. Reoffering Statement of the Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority at iii (1986) [hereinafter Reoffering Statement] (on file at The Wayne
Law Review).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 13. This capacity "exceeds the amount of waste [currently]
collected by the city by more than 200,000 tons per year." Id. Consequently,
Detroit will be forced to haul waste from other cities in order to operate the
facility efficiently.
295. Id.
296. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Air Quality Division Staff
Activity Report 2 (Oct. 16, 1984) (on file at The Wayne Law Review).
297. Id.
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The GDRRF is funded with proceeds from the sale of taxexempt industrial revenue bonds totaling $438 million. 29 Revenue
from several sources will be used to cover the annual debt service
requirements and operational costs of the GDRRF including: the
sale of steam, electricity and ferrous metals; hauling fees; and city
tipping fees. 299
2.

Effect of Federal Statutes
a. PURPA

The Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) initiated
proceedings to implement PURPA one year after the FERC issued
PURPA regulations. °° The MPSC issued an initial order that
required each utility to: (1) "amend its tariffs to remove any
existing prohibitions" against selling to, purchasing from, or operating in parallel with cogenerators or QFs; and (2) to file interim
electricity purchase rates equal to the average cost of fuel and
purchased power as determined by the most recent rates. The order
also instituted an in-depth
review of obligations and alternatives
301
to carrying out PURPA.
The MPSC final order fully implemented PURPA and encouraged joint ventures between QFs and utilities within the FERC
guidelines. 30 2 The MPSC determined that including utilities in
cogeneration plans would add needed expertise and capital to an
emerging technology, and would also help control high energy
03
costs.A
The FERC certified the GDRRF as a QF under the federal
regulations. 3°0 Detroit Edison, as an electric utility under PURPA,
is subject to the rules and regulations of the MPSC. Because
PURPA requires utilities to purchase energy from QFs, Detroit

298. The Resource Recovery Authority reoffered $500 million worth of
adjustment/fixed rate bonds, which were first issued in December 1984. Reoffering
Statement, supra note 292, at 1.
299. Id. at 7-9.
300. The initial order was issued by the Michigan Public Service Commission
on March 17, 1981. For a history of the proceedings that led to the MPSC's
final order, see Re Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 48 PUR4th 465,
469-70 (Mich. P.S.C. 1982).
301. 48 PUR4th at 467.
302. The final order was issued on August 27, 1982. Id. at 473-74.
303. Id.
304. 32 F.E.R.C. (P) 62,100, at 63,094-95 (1985).
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Edison must purchase the GDRRF's excess power output. 05
On December 16, 1985, Detroit Edison and the GDRRF entered

into an energy purchase agreement.3'

6 The

agreement provides that

Edison's primary objective is the purchase of steam for resale to
its customers; "the purchase of electricity is secondary .... -307
Edison will purchase all of the steam and electricity generated by

the GDRRF.108 Steam that the GDRRF generates and that Edison
is unable to purchase will be converted into electricity, which
Edison must buy pursuant to PURPA.
The amount of steam that the GDRRF sells to Edison is at
least the current scheduled annual quantity of 2.8 million Mlbs (
Mlb = 1000 pounds). Adjustment provisions are included in the
agreement to allow flexibility in the scheduled quantity. Edison
has the option to purchase steam in excess of the scheduled amount
and to require the facility to burn alternate fuel to meet the
scheduled steam quantity.3 °9
b.

Fuel Use Act

Since the GDRRF burns waste as its primary fuel source, the
FUA does not pose a significant problem to the project.3 10 The
305. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. Under PURPA, the QF
and the utility may contract on their own to determine the avoided cost as
reflected in the purchase rate. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
Some waste-to-energy cogeneration facilities may be at a disadvantage in comparison to other cogeneration facilities because of the low avoided energy component when waste is used as fuel, and because of the comparatively long lead
times necessary for the construction and development of waste-to-energy plants.
See Pestle & Butler, supra note 175, at 30.
In order to encourage the utilization of waste-to-energy facilities, some states
have specified relatively high electric payment rates for waste-fueled energy. For
example, New York, Connecticut, and Illinois have adopted such statutes to help
even the competition. Id. "
Michigan recently adopted legislation to encourage the use of resource
recovery facilities like the GDRRF. 1989 Mich. Legis. Serv. 1 (West) (to be
codified at MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.6o (West 1989)). The statute requires
Michigan utliities to pay full avoided cost when purchasing power from wasteto-energy facilities. This cost includes an automatic capacity rate component.
306. Reoffering Statement, supra note 292 at 57-67. The agreement is effective for 20 years after the commencement date, or until December 13, 2008,
whichever is later.
307. Id. at 57
308. Id. at 57-58.
309. Id.
310. The FUA originally prohibited the use of natural gas or petroleum as
primary energy sources, but now allows their use if the facility has the capability
to use coal or another fuel. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
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use of waste as a primary fuel is outside the ambit of the original
restriction and the amendment. Waste is an abundant fuel source
that will continue to be available in the future.
The GDRRF does have the capability to burn diesel fuel in
the event Detroit Edison wishes to buy electric power beyond that
produced by burning waste. However, diesel fuel will only be
burned in start-up procedures or in time of emergency. Therefore,
under the
it falls outside the definition of "primary fuel source"
311
FUA and is not subject to the Act's requirements.
c. Clean Air Act
The GDRRF will have significant emission problems because
it burns solid waste. The technology used in the facility to control
air pollution has been a continuing source of controversy, and has
been challenged by the EPA and several environmental groups.
The CAA requires new major emitting facilities 31z whose emissions may detrimentally affect air quality to obtain an emissions
permit that details their limitations.3 13 These limitations must conform to the CAA's goal of preventing significant deterioration
(PSD) of air quality in attainment areas. The GDRRF is located
in the Metropolitan Detroit-Port Huron Intrastate Air Quality
Control Region 3 14 which is classified as attainment for sulfur
for total
dioxides and oxides of nitrogen, and nonattainment
315
suspended particulates and carbon monoxide.
The EPA has expressly delegated complete authority to the
State of Michigan to issue permits and implement PSD regulations

311. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8302(a)(15) (West 1983 & Supp. 1989) provides:
The term "primary energy source" means the fuel or fuels used by any
existing or new electric powerplant, except it does not include, as
determined under rules prescribed by the Secretary-

(A) the minimum amounts of fuel required for unit ignition, startup,

testing, flame stabilization, and control uses, and
(B) the minimum amounts of fuel required to alleviate or prevent
(i) unanticipated equipment outages and (ii) emergencies directly affecting
the public health, safety, or welfare which would result from electric

power outages.
Id.

312. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (1982) for the definition of "major emitting

facility."

313. Id. § 7475(a)(1).
314. 40 C.F.R. § 81.37 (1988).

315. Id. § 81.323.
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with respect to each pollutant regulated by the CAA. 316 The EPA

delegated this authority only after its Region V staff had evaluated
31 7
state practices and found that they met the CAA standards.
Michigan's authority is conditioned on the Michigan Department

of Natural Resources (MDNR) reporting a summary of its findings
relative to the PSD application and its justifications for its preliminary determination to the EPA at the beginning of the permit
comment period. 31 8 The EPA must notify the MDNR of its concerns about the pending permit before the end of the comment
31 9
period.
PSD permits are issued only after thorough review by all
concerned state agencies. In the first step of the state's permit
procedure, the MDNR reviews the permit application. A second
review is conducted by the Michigan Air Pollution Control Com-

mission (MAPCC), which has the power to issue or deny the
permit. A mandatory public hearing is then held for the purpose
of allowing all interested parties to present evidence. 320 Each PSD

application must demonstrate that, among other things, the facility
will install the "best available control technology"
(BACT) for
321
each pollutant under the PSD regulations.

316. The delegation agreement states in part:
7. The primary responsibility for enforcement of the PSD regulations
in the State of Michigan will rest with the Air Quality Division [of the
MDNR]. The AQD will enforce the provisions and regulations that
pertain to the PSD program except in those cases where the rules or
policy of AQD are more stringent; in which case the State may elect to
implement the more stringent requirement. If the State enforces the
delegated provisions in a manner inconsistent with the terms and conditions of this delegation or the Clean Air Act, USEPA may exercise
its enforcement authority .

..

with respect to sources within the State

of Michigan subject to PSD provisions.
8. If the Regional Administrator determines that the State is not
implementing or enforcing the PSD program in accordance with the
terms and conditions of this delegation, the requirements of 40 CFR
section 52.21, or the Clean Air Act, this delegation, after consultation
with the AQD, may be revoked in whole or in part ....
45 Fed. Reg. 8,348-49 (1980).
317. Id. at 8,348.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1982) defines BACT as "an emission limitation
based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation
under this chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting facility,
which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is
achievable ....

"
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After the GDRRF filed its permit application on September
13, 1984, the Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority

(GDRRA) published a Notice of Public Hearing, which provided
for both a thirty day comment period and a public hearing. The
notice indicated that the state had made a "preliminary determi-

nation that the construction of the project would not violate the
[CAA]" or other state and federal laws. 3n The state, as required,
sent the EPA a copy of the notice. The EPA made no response
during the comment period and did not appear at the public
hearing.

At the hearing, the use of scrubber/baghouse technology, an
advanced emissions cleaning process, was discussed. a3 However,
the scrubber technology would have increased tipping fees by at
least forty percent and rendered the facility noncompetitive and

economically unfeasible. 324 Consequently, the review board found

that the BACT would be a fuel preprocessing method, which 32 it5
felt constituted fuel "treatment" within the definition of BACT.
The MDNR issued the facility's permit on November 9, 1984.326
On April 9, 1986, the MDNR held a special meeting to consider
whether the permit had any problems.3 27 After considering various

322. See Complaint, Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Auth. v. Adamkus,
677 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Mich. 1987) at 9 (on file at The Wayne Law Review).
323. There are two types of scrubbing: wet and dry. In wet scrubbing,
"exhaust gases in the stack with absorbent chemicals, .

.

. react with the SO, in

the stack to form a solid sludge that can be removed and disposed of on land."
F. ANDERSON, supra note 265, at 208. Wet scrubbing was ruled out for the
GDRRF because of the open land area required for settling. Report from
Combustion Engineering to EPA, Exhibit H of Complaint, supra note 322 at
33, [hereinafter C-E Report]. Dry scrubbing involves scrubbing of the exhaust
gas with dry lime or limestone and involves little or no wet chemicals. F.
ANDERSON, supra at 208.

324. The firm constructing the facility, Combustion Engineering, argued
strenuously that including a dry scrubber would increase capital costs, operational
and maintenance costs, detrimental environmental effects, and tipping fees. See

C-E Report, supra note 323, at 38-46.
325. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1982) provides that BACT is achievable "through
application of production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant."
The fuel preprocessing method utilized at the GDRRF involves various sorting
techniques designed to reduce the sulfur content of the refuse. Since solid waste
is inherently low in sulfur, the amount of sulfur dioxide passing through the
stacks will be low. C-E Report, supra note 323, at 46.
326. Complaint, supra note 322, at 10.
327. This meeting was held as a result of conflicting letters sent to the City
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presentations, the MDNR determined that there was no need to
reconsider the permit. EPA officials were unable to submit comments until the next day. The EPA's comments stated that the

permit
was deficient for not incorporating the scrubber technol328
ogy.

The EPA issued a Notice of Violation, finding that the permit
violated the Michigan SIP and Part D of the CAA.3 29 The EPA

based its determination on the fact that the permit did not require
the lowest achievable emission rate (LAER) 330 for particulate matter

and carbon monoxide, which is nonattainment in the facility's
region. 3 On May 20, 1986, based on these deficiencies, the EPA
3 32
revoked the MDNR's delegated authority to regulate the GDRRF.

of Detroit and Combustion Engineering by the Air Quality Division (AQD) of
the MDNR that reflected the AQD's belief that scrubbers might be the BACT.
See Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Auth. v. Adamkus, No. 86-CV 72910DT, slip. op. at 3-4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter Adamkus slip op.].
328. Testimony of the EPA Before the MAPCC on the Proposed Construction of the Detroit Recovery Facility, Exhibit G of Complaint, supra note 322,
at 3 [hereinafter EPA Testimony].
329. Letter from David Kee, Director Air Management Division, EPA Region
5 to Bella Marshall, Exhibit H of Complaint, supra note 322.
330. Id. LAER is defined as that rate of emissions which reflects:
(A) the most stringent emission limitation which is contained in the
implementation [plan] of any State for such class or category of source,
unless the owner or operator of the proposed source demonstrates that
such limitations are not achievable, or
(B) the most stringent emission limitation which is achieved in
practice by such class or category of source, whichever is more stringent.
42 U.S.C. § 7501(3) (1982).
331. The LAER is required by the Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission R336.1221(a) for sources of particulate matter and carbon monoxide
emissions. The GDRRF is a major stationary source under 42 U.S.C. § 76020)
(1982). 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982) provides that SIP provisions shall require
permits for new major stationary sources in nonattainment areas. Permits may
be granted only if the proposed source complies with the LAER for nonattainment
pollutants. Id. § 7503.
332. Letter from Vadas Adamkus, EPA Region 5 Administrator, to Robert
Miller, Air Quality Division, MDNR (May 20, 1986), Exhibit I, Complaint, supra
note 322. The EPA contended that it had never revoked or modified the GDRRF's
permit. See Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Greater Detroit Resource
Recovery Auth. v. Adamkus, 677 F. Supp 521 (E.D. Mich. 1987) at 14 [hereinafter
Response Brief] (on file at The Wayne Law Review). The EPA viewed the May
20, 1986 letter as merely expressing the regional administrator's (Mr. Adamkus)
intent to begin revocation proceedings. A review of the case led Mr. Adamkus
to conclude there was "insufficient basis" to pursue the revocation, and accordingly the EPA issued a letter, dated September 19, 1986, withdrawing the May
20 letter. Id.
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The GDRRA and Combustion Engineering, the builder of the
project, brought suit for injunctive and declaratory relief to halt
the EPA revocation proceedings. 33 The District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan granted the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment, enjoining the EPA from revoking the permit.3 34 The court reviewed the EPA's authority to revoke the permit
and found that, under condition eight of the delegation agreement,
the EPA could revoke the permit in whole or in part if it determined that the state was "not implementing or enforcing the PSD
program in accordance with the terms and conditions of this
delegation .... -"33 However, the court noted that the EPA had
previously audited the Michigan implementation and enforcement

333. Adamkus slip op., supra note 327. Before trial began, the plaintiffs
discovered the EPA audits of the MDNR's permitting process and the GDRRF's
permit. Earlier, the EPA had denied conducting such audits, but released them
to the plaintiff after discovering its error. The disclosed audits praised the
permitting process and found the permit satisfactory. The EPA did not challenge
the audit's findings and simply withdrew its revocation letter of May 20, 1986.
677 F. Supp. at 525. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs continued their suit in order to
stop future interference with the permit.
334. Adamkus slip op., supra note 327, at 18. The district court rejected
the defendant's arguments of the case being moot, unripe, and that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
First, the court found that the case was not moot because an actual case
and controversy existed. Id. at 13. Although the EPA had withdrawn its revocation letter, the EPA's continued assertion of inherent authority could clearly
affect the GDRRA's actions. Additionally, the court stated that even if no case
or controversy existed, the case would fall into the exception for controversies
capable of repetition yet evading review. Id. at 13. See Southern Pacific Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
Second, the court found the case to be ripe under the two part test set forth
in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). The test includes a
determination of (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision, and (2) the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. 387 U.S. at 149. The
first component requires final agency action for review. The district court held
that final agency action occurred when the permit was first issued by the state
on November 9, 1984, pursuant to the delegation agreement. Adamkus slip op.,
supra note 327, at 14. The court also found that the hardship requirement was
satisfied, noting the hundreds of millions of dollars involved in the financing
bonds and the effect that continued EPA intervention would have on their
repayment. Id. at 14-15.
Third, the court found federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1337, which provides original jurisdiction in the district courts for congressional
acts regulating commerce. Since the Clean Air Act regulated commerce, jurisdiction existed. Id. at 15-16.
335. Adamkus slip op., supra note 327, at 17. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 8,348
(1980).
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procedures and found them commendable.3 36 Because the EPA did
not submit evidence to the contrary, the court held that the EPA
337
had no basis for revoking the permit under condition eight.
Alternatively, the EPA argued it retained the "implied power"
to revoke the permit. 338 The court found this claim inconsistent
with the express grant of revocation powers to the EPA, 339 which
details the situations in which the EPA can revoke permits and
the procedures that must be followed. The court reasoned that
any authority beyond these limits was unwarranted.340

336. Adamkus slip op., supra note 327, at 17. The court quoted part of the
EPA audit report relating to the MDNR's new source review program:
The MDNR is commended for the continuing dedication of its staff
to the task of making and documenting complete reviews of new source
applications. As has been reported in earlier audits, the Staff Activity
Reports which are on file for all sources submitted for review by the
Michigan Air Pollution Control Commission (MAPCC) are noteworthy
efforts to document all factors considered in reviews of such applications.
This audit revealed no real departures from observance of and adherence
to continuing good practices.
677 F. Supp. at 523.
In addition, the court noted that in reviewing the GDRRF's permit, the EPA
stated:
"MDNR continues to competently perform the air quality analyses
required by the regulations, and a general impression obtained from the
audit is that there has been an increase in State activity in performing
independent internal reviews of modeling analyses contained in permit
applications." The EPA auditors did note, however, that in some
instances, as in the case of the GDRRA facility, the MDNR had
substituted existing data without a showing it was "representative."
Id. at 524.
The EPA disputes the implication that the permit program was foolproof.
They contend that the program was never audited for BACT, and that the BACT
deficiencies are quite clear in the audit report. Telephone interview with Eric
Cohen, Assistant Regional Counsel, EPA (Mar. 3, 1989).
337. Adamkus slip op., supra note 327.
338. See Response Brief, supra note 332, at 39-42 for an explanation of the
legal theory behind this argument.
339. Adamkus slip op., supra note 327, at 17-18.
340. Id. The district court also awarded attorney fees to the GDRRA. 677
F. Supp. 521, 529. The award was based on provisions of the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985), that allows attorney fees
unless the government's position as a litigant is "substantially justified," or if
special circumstances make an award unjust. Id. The court found that the EPA
had "no justification, factual or legal, for its actions." 677 F. Supp. at 527.
The court also stated it would be unjust not to award fees here, as the EPA
revoked the delegated authority solely to pacify vocal environmental groups. Id.
Combustion Engineering was awarded fees under another provision of the Equal
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The Detroit project illustrates that prospective cogenerators
must be concerned with suits brought under both federal and state
law. The EPA controversy was based on federal law. Just six
months after the EPA decision, four environmental groups and
the Canadian Province
of Ontario filed suit in federal court alleging
41
state law claims.1
The environmental groups sought "relief from pollution or
impairment of the air, the water, and other natural resources of
the State of Michigan threatened by the GDRRF"3 42 under the
provisions of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act
(MEPA). 343 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the GDRRA
and Combustion Engineering violated their statutory duty to minimize or prevent environmental harm by planning to install inadequate air pollution control devices, having inadequate residue
disposal plans, and failing to have separation and recycling measures. 3 4 Moreover, the organizations alleged that the defendants
violated their duty to consider and determine the environmental
impact of the facility and to consider possible alternatives. Under
each count, the environmental groups sought an injunction stopping construction of the facility.
The Ontario plaintiffs alleged under the MEPA that "the
incinerator as proposed will or is likely to pollute, impair, or
destroy the air, water, and other natural resources of the State of
Michigan and the Province of Ontario, and the public trust
therein . . . . -34- The court held that the Ontario plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue. 46 The court found that they had not demonstrated
an "injury in fact, 3 47 as the MEPA only addresses Michigan's
natural resources, "in which Ontario,
a foreign government, has
' 348
no recoverable interest or claim.
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (Supp. III 1985). The award was
based on the EPA's bad faith in actions giving rise to the claim and in litigating
the case. 677 F. Supp. at 528-29. This decision is currently on appeal.
341. Detroit Audubon Soc'y v. City of Detroit, No. 87-CV-71577-DT slip
op., (E.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 1988). The four environmental groups were the Detroit
Audubon Society, the North Cass Community Union, the Sierra Club, and the
Environmental Defense Fund.
342. Id. at 3-4.
343. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West 1987).
344. Detroit Audubon Soc'y slip op., supra note 341, at 3-4.
345. Id. at 4.
346. Id. at 8.
347. Id. at 7 (citing Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S.

91, 99 (1979)).

348. Id. at 8.
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The defendants moved for summary judgment on both plaintiffs' claims. The defendants first argued that the environmental
plaintiffs' lawsuit was untimely and barred by the doctrine of
laches. The court, applying the test set forth in State of Michigan
v. City of Allen Park,349 found that laches applied. It specifically
noted the six month delay following the resolution of the first
suit, the fact that the facility was over seventy percent complete

with completion expected in the late summer or fall of 1988, and

the $438,000,000 municipal bond expenditure.3 50 The court held

that the plaintiffs had delayed in bringing suit and that this
unnecessary delay was prejudicial to the defendants, who had
35

complied with every permit requirement. '
The defendants also argued that both plaintiffs had failed to
state a legally cognizable claim under the MEPA.3 5 2 The court held
that even assuming the plaintiffs had established a prima facie
MEPA case, the issuance of the federal permit "creates an unrebuttable presumption that the defendants' conduct is consistent
with the promotion of the health, safety, and welfare of Michigan
citizens and that no feasible and prudent alternatives are available. ' 353 The court went on to note that the traditional deference
given to an agency's reasonable interpretations precludes a judicial
de novo review of agency decisions. 354
VII.

CONCLUSION

The use of cogeneration is promoted by a regulatory structure
that guarantees a market for the surplus power produced by
349. 501 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1980). The doctrine of laches applies
if (I) the plaintiffs delay filing suit, (2) the delay prejudices or harms the
defendant(s), and (3) the delay is inexcusable. Id. at 1016-17.
350. Detroit Audubon Soc'y, slip op., supra note 341 at 15.
351. Id. at 16.
352. In order to establish a prima facie case under the MEPA, a plaintiff
must show that the defendants' conduct "has, or is likely to pollute, impair or
destroy the air, water or other natural resources or the public trust therein . ..."
MICH. CoMIp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1203(1) (West 1987). Defendants may rebut the

prima facie case by showing (1)that their conduct is consistent with the public
health, safety, and welfare, and (2) that no feasible and prudent alternative exists.
The defendants in Detroit Audubon Soc'y also argued that the plaintiffs
were barred from bringing suit by res judicata. The district court rejected this
claim, holding that the plaintiffs were not in privity with the EPA, the plaintiff
in the prior case. Detroit Audubon Soc'y slip op., supra note 341, at 17.
353. Detroit Audubon Soc'y slip op., supra note 341, at 21.
354. Id. at 25 (citing National-Southwire Aluminum Co. v. EPA, No. 863982 (6th Cir. 1988)).
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cogenerators. Through the enactment of PURPA, Congress clearly
stated the national goal of encouraging the more efficient use of
energy resources.
State commissions have historically exercised control over the
retail market for electric power and have the primary responsibility
for implementing PURPA under the FERC guidelines. States have
independently carried out the federal mandate in accordance with
local needs, conditions, and persuasions. As a result, cogeneration
is subject to a range of regulatory patterns. After ten years of
experience under PURPA, the proposed FERC amendments35
represent a reaffirmation of PURPA's goals and an attempt to
correct its weaknesses to enable more effective state implemention
of the statute. In order to realize the full benefits of cogeneration's
regulatory structure, the prospective cogenerator must carefully
adhere to the requirements of PURPA, the FUA, and the CAA.
The construction and approval process for the GDRRF is a
prime example of the workings of the regulatory structure governing cogeneration in the United States. The extensive CAA litigation
involving the GDRRF illustrates the opposition a cogenerator may
meet in initiating and completing the facility. More important, the
litigation's outcome proves that compliance with state and federal
procedures required under the CAA will lead to vindication of a
cogenerator's right to build and operate a cogeneration facility.
In the last analysis, the implementation of PURPA has caused
an unprecedented boom in cogeneration, fostering substantial growth
in virtually every state. The future for cogeneration appears bright.

355. See supra notes 208-44 and accompanying text.

